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Abstract

New weapons system analysis is a field with much interest and study due to the
requirement to constantly update and improve the military’s capability set. Particularly,
as development, testing, fielding and employment of any new weapon system can be
quite costly, justifications of acquisition decisions need to be made carefully in order to
provide the capabilities needed at the least possible cost. Getting as much information as
possible to make these decisions, through analysis of the weapons systems benefits and
costs, yields better decisions. This study has twin goals. The first is to demonstrate a
sound methodology to yield the most information about benefits of a particular weapon
system. Second, we wish to provide some baseline analysis of the benefits of a new type
of missile, the Small Advanced Capability Missile (SACM) concept, in an unclassified
general sense that will help improve further, more detailed, classified investigations into
the benefits of this missile. In a simplified, unclassified scenario, we show that the
SACM provides several advantages and we demonstrate a basis for further investigation
into the tactics used in conjunction with the SACM. Furthermore, we discuss how each
of the chosen factors influences the air combat scenario. Ultimately, we establish the
usefulness of a designed experimental approach to analysis of agent-based simulation
models, which yields a great amount of information about the complex interactions of
different actors on the battlefield.
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AGENT-BASED MODELING METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING WEAPONS
SYSTEMS

I.

Introduction

Background
Introduction of a new missile into the complex system of air combat necessarily
causes major changes to the outcomes of air combat. The Air Force wages air combat to
achieve certain strategic objectives using specific air combat tactics. The objectives can
be to gain air superiority in theater, or destroy strategic enemy ground targets, etc.
(Bullock, McIntyre, & Hill, 2000). An emerging strategic objective is to attack the boost
phase of ballistic missiles using the Airborne Weapons Layer concept (AWL) (Corbett,
2013) and (Rood, Chilton, Campbell, & Jenkins, 2013). These requirements have led to
recent missile technologies that are agile enough to perform multiple traditional and
emerging roles. This paper explores a potential methodology for analyzing the missile
system in a constructive agent-based simulation model.
The main characteristics of the new missile technology examined in our research
include hit-to-kill technology in which the missile uses a kinetic warhead to attack the
target, agility in that the missile’s guidance, propulsion, and control surfaces allow it to
maneuver more flexibly towards a target, and a smaller size allowing each fighter to carry
more missiles. These new weapons have the potential for dramatically changing the
range of possible tactics and mission roles allowed.
Complex systems are typically modeled through simulation in order to provide
comprehensive information about how the system performs. Agent-based modeling has
1

the potential to provide additional information about the potential use of a weapon due to
the inherent learning or adaptive characteristics of the agents in the simulation model
(Bullock, McIntyre, & Hill, 2000).
Problem Statement
In order to better define the benefits provided by a missile with more flexible
capabilities, an analysis methodology is required to show the effects to the overall air
combat system of the factors of improved agility, decreased size, and hit to kill
capability. The main problem addressed in this thesis is identifying an appropriate
methodology for studying a new weapon system, specifically in this case a missile
system. Our research seeks to show an analysis method of the effects of a new weapon
on tactics and combat decision making by modeling flexible agent behaviors in a mission
level combat simulation.
Research Objective and Scope
Objective.
The objective of this study is to develop a methodology to analyze a new type of
missile system and explore the range of tactics to employ this missile. Specifically, the
objective is to quantify the significance and contribution of particular characteristics of a
new missile system over existing missile systems using a statistical and practical
comparison approach. This methodology also applies in a more general sense to new
platform delivered weapon systems and perhaps even new types of sensors and
communications systems. Below, we describe the overall system in terms of the
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components, such as platform, weapon, sensor, etc. Following that is a sketch of the
agent-based simulation approach.
System Description.
Air combat is a complex system where there are opposing forces with opposing
objectives (Bullock, McIntyre, & Hill, 2000). Air combat is conducted by opposing
forces using attack aircraft, defense aircraft, and defense ground platforms using a variety
of systems, from guns and energy weapons to missiles. The focus of this study is the
missile weapon system as a component of the air combat framework. For the purposes of
this study, search and acquisition sensors for all fighters are held to be generic targeting
sensors. Fighter platforms are held as fourth generation fighter aircraft.
The focus of the investigation is on weapon factors such as range, speed, turning
radius, weight, air-to-air capability, air-to-ground capability, or both, end-game guidance
precision, accuracy, and type of warhead. Additionally, we use pilot and commander
behavioral modeling to study different air combat tactics in relation to these weapon
factors.
Approach.
We choose a simulation model to study the complexities of air combat.
Specifically, we use agent-based simulation because of the ability of simulated agents to
model a complex adaptive system (Bullock, McIntyre, & Hill, 2000).
There are several statistical methods available for conducting analysis of
simulation models (Law, 2007). The main statistical approach taken to analyze the
simulation output data is a designed experiment in order to more fully understand the
significance of the factors involved in the system.
3

Investigative Questions/Issues
Issues and Essential Elements of the Analysis.
All studies begin with a breakdown into the main investigative questions that
define the problem under study. For this study, the focus is on the missile system
component of air combat. The following questions define the exploratory space:
1. What is the benefit of being able to carry more missiles? How does
size/weight of missile affect mission outcomes?
New missile technologies are consistently providing more and more compact
electronics guidance packages, control mechanisms, and warhead capabilities.
Combined, these new missiles are smaller and lighter. This is not without tradeoffs, such
as speed, and the need for increased accuracy and precision within the on-board guidance
systems.
2. What is the proper mix of weapons? How does mission mode (air-to-air,
air-to-ground) affect mission outcomes? Is there a benefit to carrying a
mix of weapons?
Having multi-role missile systems means being able to strike a wide range of
target types, from ground to air, fast moving to slow moving. However, tradeoffs in the
missiles systems to include newer technologies such as those discussed above in speed,
etc., suggests that a strict replacement of traditional single-role missiles may have a
detrimental effect. In other words, there may still be a need for the faster medium range
air-to-air missiles.
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3. What new tactics are possible given new weapon characteristics? Do
tactics change over the range of each of the characteristics of the new
missile type?
With these new missiles capabilities, fighter pilots may no longer need to conduct
some of the aerial maneuvers required with current missile capabilities or there may be
more optimal maneuvers when engaging enemy fighters or ground targets. This can
effect pilot training and fighter doctrine extensively.
Indicator Measures of Effectiveness and Performance.
To explore the different issues, we develop several response measures. The basic
procedure is to create different scenarios with each factor of the system set at different
levels and then execute multiple replications of the simulation model for each scenario,
measuring specific responses. These responses correspond to measures of effectiveness
and performance (MOE/MOP) of the system. These measures are indicators that answer
the questions from section 1.4.1.
MOE 1: Time to service Target set for a given mission.
This is the average time until the Blue force completes clearance of the sweep
area. We do not specify that the Blue must destroy every target within the sweep area,
but rather this is the time until all Blue forces arrive at the end of the designated sweep
route after having engaged/destroyed as many of the opposing forces as possible. The
time it takes to complete the mission is an indicator that provides information about
questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 1.4.1. This MOE shows some effect in terms of
efficiency gained or lost when using the new missile technology.
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MOE 2: Percentage of target set destroyed at scenario end.
This MOE is a measure of overall mission effectiveness. The goal is to ensure the
mission area is as clear of opposing forces as possible. We calculate MOE 2 by finding
the number of opposing force targets destroyed during the mission, then dividing by the
total number of targets at the scenario start. This MOE provides information about
questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 1.4.1 and addresses effectiveness gained or lost.
MOE 3: Weapon effectiveness.
In comparison with different levels of factors settings, it shows the improvement
or decline in effectiveness and efficiency of the missile system, though we term it
“effectiveness” for brevity. This MOE is the number of weapons required to produce one
enemy kill. Weapon effectiveness can be calculated using the average number of
weapons fired along with numbers of targets destroyed. This MOE provides information
about questions 1, 2, and 3 in section 1.4.1.
MOE 4: Standoff of Engagements.
This MOE is a measure of the average distance that Blue agents deploy weapons
against targets in each scenario. The set of standoff performance measures, such as
average engagement distance, may be substantially different from the baseline scenario
due to the interaction of the range of a missile and the size of the missile. Smaller
missiles cannot carry as much fuel, and therefore usually lack the range or the speed of
larger missiles. This MOE is an indicator of the type of tactics employed by the agents in
the model and addresses question 3 from section 1.4.1.
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MOE 5: Blue side Vulnerability.
Blue side vulnerability measures the number of hits the opposing force
successfully makes on Blue agents. In order to observe this response, we set the Blue
agents to invulnerable. This allows us to see how many times the agents place
themselves into risk situations based on the weapon loads they are carrying, the tactics
they are using and the composition of the Red force they are facing. The MOE provides
additional information on question 1, 2, and 3 from section 1.1.
MOE 6: Qualitative Engagement Results.
This MOE is a more subjective measure used to capture insights learned from
viewing the playback of numerous design point scenarios, including those scenarios
whose response appear to be outliers as well as scenarios whose treatment combinations
are more in the middle of the design region of the simulation experiment. While we use
the playbacks more for verification of the simulation model and troubleshooting potential
errors, the results do have some impact on our view of the validity of the model and
interpretation of the statistical analysis.
Constraints, Limitations, Assumptions
Constraints.
The first constraints imposed are that the model used to conduct this research is a
mission-level scenario as opposed to a higher-level theater wide or strategic scenario and
that the scenario is of a limited time duration. This constraint follows directly from the
availability of agent-based combat models and time limitations detailed below. Combat
model development is a lengthy process and long, detailed scenarios in higher-level
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agent-based constructive simulations are processing intensive. To provide an acceptable
scope for constructing and analyzing a model sufficient to gain insight into a weapon
system and demonstrate a methodology for analyzing a new missile technology in the
available time, we chose a mission-level model of a limited simulation mission time for
this research.
Additionally, the models created are constrained to one mission type. Again, the
time available to conduct this research necessitates that combat model development be
simplified. The complexity of the analysis of each factor’s significance in contribution to
multiple responses of interest increases immensely if multiple mission types are studied.
One final constraint is that this research is limited to unclassified information.
Therefore, we use less detailed data, in terms of missile capabilities and air combat
tactics, of all the systems involved. Classified research can be conducted using these
methodologies, but is again beyond the time available for this study.
Limitations.
The main limitation for this study is the time available to complete this research.
Assumptions.
The first assumption is that interactions between platform sensor and weapon
performance are negligible. In other words, each scenario maintains a constant generic
platform sensor. This assumption refers to the sensor on the aircraft, not guidance
package available on the missile. An addendum to this assumption is the assumption that
Blue will always have superior sensors, such AWACS, and command and control
networks. Given this assumption, the model implements a slight advantage in range of
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the fire control sensor to the Blue side, but does not implement a complicated command
and control network or utilize AWACS for an integrated air picture.
Another assumption is that each flight, both Blue and Red come in pairs (number
of aircraft is multiple of two.) Additionally, red ground units are in groups of four under
one command and control element and all threat ground units in the scenario are SAMs,
Command and Control, or SAM radars.
A final assumption is that it is sufficient to demonstrate this methodology for
analyzing a new weapon system on a smaller, less complicated scenario. Specifically for
this study, we use a “sweep”-type mission in which a group of Blue aircraft moves
through battlespace with the mission of clearing the zone of enemy aircraft and air
defense systems.
Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 is divided into three sections that include Department of Defense
(DOD) use and classification of models and simulation, agent-based modeling, an
overview of the Analytic Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling
(AFSIM), and some statistical analysis methods used for simulation analysis including
some basic experimental design information. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology,
scenario, and analysis techniques used in this research. Chapter 4 provides analysis of
the simulation model to illustrate the methodology in Chapter 3 and to provide some level
of verification and validation. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the main conclusion and
recommendations regarding this analysis methodology using an agent-based simulation
model to analyze a combat system.

9

II.

Literature Review

Overview
This research is an effort to define a methodology for use of agent-based modeling
(ABM) to analyze the effectiveness of a new type of missile in air combat. We review
Department of Defense (DOD) Modeling and Simulation modeling classifications, agent
based modeling and complex adaptive systems, including different agent behavioral
architectures, and various statistically based methodologies for analyzing simulation
output. This review includes a survey of several past works using a simulation to model
combat with a focus on analyzing a particular weapon system. The focus throughout is
on providing a scientifically sound method for discovering the differences between a
combat scenario with current technologies and the scenario with addition of the new
weapon system.
Department of Defense (DOD) Models and Simulation
Generally, simulation models are classified by whether they are dynamic or static
(simulation includes the component of time or not), continuous or discrete, deterministic
or stochastic (simulation does not include random effects or does), and descriptive or
prescriptive (simulation either describes the system or is intended to provide a set of
optimal settings for the system) (Hill & McIntyre, 2001) (Law, 2007). We are most
interested in the set of simulation models that are dynamic, stochastic, and descriptive in
nature for the particular problem of analyzing a new weapon system. Prescriptive models
can also be useful for discovering the best tactics or weapon system characteristics, such
as how many of each type of weapon in a weapon mix problem, that maximize the
10

effectiveness of the Blue force in a given scenario. A number of useful simulation
models are classified as discrete event simulations in that they perform calculations of the
system state at discrete points in time based on scheduled events (Hill & McIntyre, 2001).
DOD classifies simulation models according to the way the model is used and the
model level of resolution. Simulation models are classified into three broad categories
within DOD (Hill & McIntyre, 2001). Live simulations are training exercises with troops
and equipment conducting missions in a real environment simulated to look and feel like
real combat situations, such as the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,
California. Virtual simulation models entail troops/pilots working in simulators, such the
Close Combat Trainer for ground troops, various M1 SEP, M2 Bradley and HMMVW
vehicle simulators, and various aircraft simulators. These simulators are built to mimic
as closely as possible the operation of the real vehicles. Finally, constructive simulations
are closed models run without any human interaction. There are also hybrids of virtual,
live, and constructive simulations, in that an experiment or training scenario is run as a
confederation of these three types of models. The constructive class of models is the
class applicable to this research.
Figure 1 is a diagram of the DOD model hierarchy. The diagram shows the
classification of each simulation model according to its level of aggregation and
resolution. Aggregation is defined by the DOD as “the process of grouping entities while
preserving the salient effects of entity behavior and interaction while grouped” (DOD
Models and Simulation Coordination Office, 2014). Resolution is defined by DOD as
“the degree of detail used to represent aspects of the real world or a specified standard or
referent by a model or simulation” (DOD Models and Simulation Coordination Office,
11

2014). Aggregation and resolution are inversely proportional to each other, as the level
of aggregation goes up, i.e. entities are consolidated from individual instances into higher
level units, the amount of resolution of the model goes down, i.e. less detail per
individual base level entity, and vice versa. An example of this is several infantry
Soldiers modeled as conducting combat operations is of higher resolution than the model
of an infantry company, made up of Soldiers, that does not explicitly calculate the actions
of the individual Soldiers in the company.

Figure 1: Department of Defense Model Hierarchy with Several Exemplar Models
for each level (Adapted from (Hill & McIntyre, 2001))
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Campaign-level models are the highest aggregation, providing a simulation of
only aggregated units at a top level. This type of simulation is useful for providing
information on the actions of large units within a longer period (over several weeks or
months). The campaign level model rolls up the results of many missions and operations
using less detailed calculations. Because of the size of the units involved and length of
time, aggregation means that the results are not as detailed, but the simulation model’s
computation time is drastically reduced.
Mission-level models provide a more detailed simulation of entities over the
course of single missions. These models are less aggregated and therefore more
computationally intensive, meaning that the simulation model takes longer to run. These
models usually simulate a system over hours of time rather than days and have much
higher resolution, tracking individual platforms (entities) and providing feedback on
entity actions and state.
Engagement-level models are of the highest resolution and are used to model
specific engagements. The scenario time lengths for these models is usually minutes and
involve a single set of circumstances, such as one exchange of missiles for two opposing
sets of fighters. Finally, engineering-level models, of which there are many, are usually
constructed by engineers to help understand the dynamics of a particular entity, such as a
missile in flight.
Examples of each of the types of models in the hierarchy are shown in the
diagram at Figure 1. These examples are primarily Air Force models, but there are many
more simulation models across the DOD. The focus of this study are mission level
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models, which provide a fair amount of fidelity, while allowing tractable computation
times for a short duration study.
Organizations across the DOD use simulation and modeling for training,
acquisition of new equipment and weapons, and research into new tactics, techniques,
and procedures. The purpose of our research is to study the use of a new missile system
within an air combat environment. Therefore, the focus is on developing a mission level
scenario in a dynamic, stochastic, discrete event simulation model. For this study, we use
the Analytic Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling (AFSIM) to develop
out model. We discuss AFSIM in more detail in section 2.3.6.
Agent-Based Simulations
Complex Adaptive Systems and Agent-Based Modeling.
According to the DoD Models and Simulation Coordination Office’s M&S
Glossary, adaptive systems are those “able to modify its behavior according to changes in
its external environment or internal components of the system itself” (DOD Models and
Simulation Coordination Office, 2014). Middleton defines complex adaptive systems as
“dynamically interacting open systems, characterized by “emergence”, with non-linear
and chaotic behaviors” (Middleton, 2010). Complex adaptive systems are ones in which
individual decision-making entities act and react to the environment around them as they
attempt to accomplish their specific goals. In agent-based modeling (ABM), the
decision-making entities, such as pilots or Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) crew,
which we call agents throughout the rest of the paper, “learn” from the environment
around them by reacting according to adaptive rules or models. This can lead to the
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emergence of complex combinations of behaviors. An important point to note here is
that ABM is not mutually exclusive of a discrete-event simulation. ABM can incorporate
continuous or discrete-event timing. Most ABMs use discrete-event timing, as we do in
our simulation model.
ABM is a form of simulation modeling that uses artificial intelligence techniques
to provide agents in a simulation with goals and rules for how they may act towards
attaining those goals. Parunak, Savit, and Riolo (1998) published similarities between
ABM and the more traditional equation based methods of simulation and developed
criteria for choosing one method over the other for a particular problem. The three main
criteria that Parunak, Savit and Riolo present concerning the choice of modeling
technique involve model structure, system representation and the degree of validity,
coupled with the simplicity, of the overall model. ABM is best suited for a model
structure where the basic state of the system depends on the behaviors of individual
agents within the system. Because air combat is a complex adaptive system in which
each side is continually reacting to the actions of the other side and to the state of the
environment while attempting to complete the mission, air combat can be described in
terms of agent behaviors.
However, the model structure is mixed, as it also can be described in terms of the
equations governing how aircraft fly and weapons deploy. Therefore, a mixed ABM and
equation-based model is best as a system representation of the air combat system. We
feel that a simulation model that combines ABM with equation-based representation of
weapons and platforms provides a valid representation of air combat as it includes not
only the mechanical functioning of the weapons and vehicles but also a model of the
15

behaviors associated with the pilots as they assess each situation and decide on an
appropriate course of action.
Agent Decision Making in Simulations.
As stated previously, agent based modeling uses artificial intelligence techniques
from the computer science word to simulate agent decision making. Gat (1998) talks
about a three-layered approach to robotic control systems. Gat’s (1998) three layers in
the AI control structure are the “deliberative”, “reactive”, and the “sequencing” layers.
This structure seems to be common to robotic control systems, as Gat points out.
Although Gat and others developed this three-layer architecture for robotic control
systems, many AI computer programs have taken advantage of the ideas behind the threelayer structure.
The deliberative layer is the planner. The job of the deliberative layer is to plan
intermediate goals on the way to achieving the overall goals of the agent. This layer can
be thought of, within the air combat context, as the higher-level cognitive functions of the
pilot that plan ahead and attempt to match weapons to targets, set waypoints, determine
optimal flying formations, and other planning functions.
The reactive layer is the set of behaviors that responds to the environment. The
reactive layer chooses the best actions to cope with the state of the world as it is. For
instance, a pilot may suddenly have an enemy missile lock on his aircraft and need to
conduct evasive maneuvers. The reactive layer is a composed of base behaviors and
actions that have no memory of the state of the world. It is fully vested in the current
state and the best reaction to that state.
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The sequencing layer is short-term goal driven. The sequencing layer is the layer
that allows the reactive layer and the deliberative layer to work together to accomplish
goals. Based on goals received from the deliberative layer, the sequencing layer
sequences reactive actions to react to the environment while still striving to meet goals.
The sequencer has memory of the state of the world only in that it will remember actions
taken that may influence future actions. For instance, if an action taken was not
successful in, say, destroying an enemy target, the sequencing layer “remembers” that the
last action taken was not successful. The layer then checks if destroying the enemy target
is still a goal and queries the reactive layer for an action different from the last
unsuccessful action to use for accomplishing the goal of destroying the enemy target.
Agent Deliberative Planning Functions.
In context of a mission level combat model, the agents must be able to conduct
three main functions within their deliberative planning layer. First, the agent plans routes
and sets waypoints to meet overall mission goals. In a movement to contact, the mission
would be to clear some battle space by attempting to gain contact with enemy agents. To
plan a route through this battle space with this goal, some sort of algorithm for efficiently
searching throughout the space could be used, keeping track of where the agent has been
and then planning the next waypoint. There are numerous heuristic and analytic methods
for finding optimal routes depending on the mission. Our research focuses on a single
scenario with fixed routes, so this planning function is not needed.
The next two functions relate to engaging an enemy agent. The agent’s
deliberative planner must be able to decide what tactics to use when engaging the threat
and the agent must assign specific weapons to specific targets. Choosing tactics can
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simply be a rule-based heuristic depending on the situation, the enemy weapons and
capabilities, whether the enemy agent is aware of the agent or not, and many more
considerations.
The weapon-target assignment problem, on the other hand, has been extensively
studied. Assigning a weapon to a target while accounting for amount and types of
weapons available, type of target, possibility of future targets, and many other factors,
can quickly become a computationally intensive task. Many methods have been
proposed for solving this problem, mostly as a matter of optimizing the outcomes over a
period of time. Ahner and Parson (2013) propose a dynamic programming approach that
uses Monte Carlo methods and a Markov Decision Process-like algorithm that would
solve the problem for the simulation scenario, create an optimal policy, and then provide
the agent the optimal policy as a tool for execution within the simulation. Genetic and
other Evolutionary methods have been proposed for finding the optimal solution to this
problem (Hill, et al. 2001; Chen, et al. 2009). Even game theory has been proposed as a
method for use in solving these types of problems for an agent in a simulation (Cruz, et
al., 2001). More discussion describing various linear programming, network flow, and
heuristic algorithms for solution of the weapon-target assignment problem can be found
in the paper by Ahuja, et al. (2003).
The method we focus on in this research for assigning a weapon to a target is to
evaluate each target in the context of the simulation time with a simple heuristic. The
flight lead agent considers the range to the target, number and types of weapons left and
their effectiveness against the particular target, the perception of what the target’s
lethality is against an agent’s own platform, and the probability of targets existing in the
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future of the simulation. Once the algorithm finds that for each target, the agent assigns
weapons/assets to each target according to some value rule. This method can be
considered a greedy approach that may not yield an optimum weapon-target pairing.
However, the point of an AI in a simulation is to provide more “human”-like decision
making to bring the model more in line with real world decision making.
Agent Reactive Behavior Architectures.
There have been many proposals for reactive behavior architectures from both the
world of robotic control and video game AI. Many of them have their roots in the
combined simple behavior machines of Braitenberg (1984). These machines combined
basic, very simple behaviors that, when combined, produce complex, unexpected
behaviors that could be likened to human behaviors. Finite state machines provide a way
for an agent to constantly sense the state of the world and then react by moving to a
different state if the sensed state of the world signals the need to change based on a set of
defined transition rules. Spronck, et al. (2006) propose one particularly interesting
reactive architecture in which the agent is assigned a randomly generated set of rules
from a master list for reacting to different situations. When the agent encounters an
engagement with enemy agents, a weighting algorithm updates the agent’s rules based on
how well they worked in the engagement. In this manner, the pool of probable rules to
be included in the AI’s engagement script is optimized. This is a type of reinforcement
learning algorithm (Spronck, Ponsen, Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper, & Postma, 2006).
One of the most common reactive architectures used for agent AI’s is Behavior
Trees (BT). BTs have been widely used in video gaming in games such as Halo 4 to
make the game AI’s more dynamic and provide a more realistic experience to the player.
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Marzinotto, et al. (2014) provides a very good discussion of BTs and their construction,
including a mathematical basis and comparison with finite state machines.
BTs are rule sets that operate by attempting to provide execution instructions to
the agent based on the state of the simulation at the time the agent queries the BT root
node. Execution of the BT begins at the root node. Each BT has only one root node, but
there can be several different BTs even within the same agent used for different
situations. The root node queries down the tree and each sub-node attempts to execute its
subordinate behaviors according to each sub-node’s basic type. There are usually four
non-leaf nodes cited in literature (Marzinotto, Colledanchise, Smith, & Ogren, 2014).
The four are Selector, Sequence, Parallel, and Decorator nodes. The symbols used for
Root, Select, and Sequence throughout this study are shown in Figure 2 through Figure 4.

Figure 2: Root Node (Standard Symbol Adopted throughout this paper)

Figure 3: Selector Node (Standard Symbol Adopted throughout this paper)
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Figure 4: Sequence Node (Standard Symbol Adopted throughout this paper)

Selector nodes attempt to run subordinate nodes from left to right until they find a
node that will run. This means that the first node the selector encounters that is capable
of executing is the only node that the selector runs. A sequence node attempts to run
each of its subordinate nodes until it hits a subordinate node that does not run. If the
sequence of subordinate nodes does not complete, the sequence node will return a false,
because the sequence node was unsuccessful. A parallel node, of which the root node is a
special case, attempts to run all subordinate nodes and behaviors simultaneously.
Decorator nodes control the synchronization of separate agents with different behavior
trees. In other words, this type of node allows cooperative behaviors between different
agents (Marzinotto, Colledanchise, Smith, & Ogren, 2014). This study does not use
decorator nodes explicitly in because AFSIM does not yet have resources in the scripting
language that allow this type of node. Instead, between agent cooperation is somewhat
hardcoded into the BTs for each agent, as we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 3.
Leaf nodes are the very basic node at which execution of the behaviors takes
place. These nodes have no subordinate nodes. The two types of leaf nodes are Action
and Condition (Marzinotto, Colledanchise, Smith, & Ogren, 2014). Figure 5 and Figure
6, respectively, illustrate the standard symbols we have adopted within this paper for
representing these two types of nodes. Action nodes execute actions. These nodes use
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algorithms to calculate speeds, trajectories, weapons release points, etc, and then make
the agent perform turns, increase/decrease in speed, etc. Conditional nodes test the state
of the agent’s environment (the simulation) for some condition. Conditional nodes are
usually combined with a set of action nodes under a sequential node.

Figure 5: Conditional Node (Standard Symbol Adopted throughout this paper)

Figure 6: Action Node (Standard Symbol Adopted throughout this paper)

Figure 7 depicts a very basic BT by way of example. This example was adapted
from Marzinotto, et al. (2014), to illustrate the operation of a simple BT. The example is
a BT for a robot, but could easily be applied to a simulation of a robot where the robot is
the agent in the simulation. The robot has a goal to walk forward. Execution of the BT
begins at the Root node. The Root node simultaneously attempts to run all subordinate
nodes. In this case, there is just one, a Select node. The Select node starts with the
subordinate node furthest to the left, which happens to be another Select node. This
subordinate Select node runs a sequence that checks if the motor is too hot to run or has a
low battery. If this Sequence node is unable to run, then the node passes a false back to
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the parent Select node. The parent Select node then attempts to run its next subordinate
node, another Sequence node that checks if the robot has fallen down.

Figure 7: Example Behavior Tree layout (Adapted from Marzinotto, et al.)

If neither of the Sequence nodes returns running or true, then the parent Select
node returns false. This causes the Select node just below the Root node to move on to
its next subordinate node, a Sequence node. This next Sequence node executes a “Stand
Up” behavior (Action node). If the robot is already standing, the stand up behavior will
just return “running”. Running or true tells the Sequence node to move to the next
subordinate behavior, which is a “Walk Forward” behavior. Note that this BT could
become much more complicated if it accounted for navigational instructions, obstacle
avoidance, or other interactions with the environment such as picking up and dropping
objects.
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Another reactive behavior architecture proposed by Woolley and Peterson (2009)
is called the Unified Behavior Framework (UBF). The UBF has a tree data structure
similar to BTs, but they differ from BT’s in two main ways. First, the entire UBF
evaluates before the agent executes any actions. The UBF returns a recommended set of
actions to the agent and the agent then implements this recommendation. This separates
out the “thinking” from the “doing”. Secondly, arbiters at each level of the tree evaluate
the child behaviors recommended actions using both the magnitude of the actions
proposed and the value of the vote given by the behavior. Each arbiter is essentially a
heuristic or value function that chooses which actions to implement at that level of the
UBF tree. There are many different types of arbitration algorithms used, some of which
Woolley and Peterson (2009) detail.
The UBF works by populating a vector of basic actions, for instance heading,
altitude, thrust, fire weapon, etc., at the root node of the UBF tree. This action vector
comes straight from the arbiter at the top of the tree. The UBF then passes this vector to
the agent for execution. The theory is that this way of combining very basic behaviors
into an action vector can lead to some emergent behaviors as the agent deals with the
state of its environment (Woolley & Peterson, 2009). Figure 8 shows an example of the
UBF structure with the action vector output from the top node of the UBF tree. The
controller represents the sequencing layer of the agent.
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Figure 8: Unified Behavior Framework Example for an agent conducting air
combat

Sequencing Behaviors and incorporating mission goals.
The sequencing layer manages agent behaviors and accounts for near, mid, and
long-term goals in agent decision making. The sequencing layer has the ability to
“remember” the state of actions past. For example, if a robot tried to turn left after
encountering an obstacle, but encountered another obstacle, the sequencing layer would
have memory of this action and not allow the reactive layer to place the robot back into
the state where it is facing the original obstacle.
In addition, it receives goals from the deliberative layer. It queries the reactive
layer for action by feeding it those goals necessary for the reactive architecture to
operate, such as the task of destroying a detected enemy and the state of that enemy. The
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reactive architecture than calculates the behavior needed to “react” to that “state”, for
instance conduct a pure pursuit (head on) and fire weapon.
The sequencing layer performs agent cooperation, such as targeting, formation
flying, and tactical cooperation, in order to achieve near-term and end game goals. In
BTs, the sequencing layer has to be thoughtfully incorporated into the tree structure in
order to work properly. In other words, part of the sequencing behavior is the order in
which the Select and Sequence nodes encounter subordinate nodes. The deliberative
layer incorporates another part of the sequencing layer along with the resources that
allow communication of the simulation environmental state to the BT.
Analytic Framework for Simulation (AFSIM).
AFSIM, formerly known as Analytic Framework for Network Enabled Systems
(AFNES), is an agent-based simulation framework developed by Boeing and now
managed by AFRL/RQ. A simulation framework, like AFSIM, is a set of tools, also
known in the programming world as a library, and is used for loading simulation
scenarios, populating different objects within the simulation, and then controlling the
simulation execution (Zeh & Birkmire, 2014). Because AFSIM is object-oriented, it is
important to define here what we mean by “objects” in the context of AFSIM and
simulation, in general. Objects can be almost anything within a program. Platforms,
sensors, and weapons are examples of objects that populated within AFSIM. Figure 9
provides a depiction from the AFSIM Overview Report of all the simulation control
components and simulation objects that reside within a scenario in AFSIM (Zeh &
Birkmire, 2014). AFSIM uses a special simulation scripting language to define objects.
Agents in AFSIM are then really a combination of different platform, sensor, and weapon
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objects. The heart of an agent is the decision making and information flow produced by
the processor objects. Some of these processors are discussed in more detail in Chapter
3, but are briefly mentioned in the rest of this section.
AFSIM uses a base simulation engine, called Simulation of Autonomously
Generated Entities (SAGE), and the framework has the ability to add different models
into the framework as plug-ins. SAGE reads in the text files defining the simulation
scenario and executes the AFSIM commands in the text files by calculating interactions
between the defined objects over time in a discrete-event manner within the context of a
specified geographical area. AFSIM also includes an agent behavior engine, called the
Reactive Integrated Planning aRchitecture (RIPR) which implements a Behavior Tree
reactive behavior architecture coupled with “quantum-tasker processor” objects that act
as the deliberative and sequencing layers of the AI architecture. The RIPR model is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Figure 9: AFSIM Architecture overview showing the simulation control
infrastructure and simulation components (Zeh & Birkmire, 2014)

Objects that make up an AFSIM scenario include platforms (ground vehicles,
aircraft, missiles, etc.), sensors, communications systems, weapons, processors used to
perform calculations on tracks or make decisions, scenario definition, input/output
objects defining setup files and output files, and other script objects defined by the user
that contain AFSIM commands. The scripting language is a C++ like programming
language that allows access to AFSIM library objects. Figure 10 depicts the various
objects that make up a platform within AFSIM and can be accessed through the scripting
language (Zeh & Birkmire, 2014).
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Figure 10: AFSIM Platform Components (AFSIM Overview, 2014)

Analysis of Weapon Systems Using Simulation
Statistical Approaches to Analyzing Simulations.
There are several statistical approaches for analyzing simulation model output in
relation to the main factors. A survey of some of the recommended methods is given in
the next section. We detail statistical methods for conducting a designed simulation
experiment in the section after that.
Traditional Simulation Scenario Analysis.
Most traditional statistical techniques for analyzing outputs of a simulation
revolve around comparing one or more simulation scenarios to each other. An example
is to compare the mean number of hits by a specific weapon for one scenario with one
weapon system to the mean for another scenario with a different weapon. Several
statistical measures of comparison are used.
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First, we discuss some commonly used techniques for the comparison of two
scenario outputs. The means of the output data for two scenarios can be compared using
the Paired t-Test or the Two-Sample t-Test assuming unequal variance (Welch T).
Additionally, the medians of the data can be compared using the non-parametric
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test.
The Two-Sample t-Test assuming unequal variance requires independent input
samples, and that the response (output data) is normally distributed. With most outputs
of a simulation, the outputs are assumed normally distributed, but not always. This test is
robust to the normal assumption, so small problems with this particular assumption will
not cause large issues. This test is often used when the analyst has different sample sizes
for each of the input systems and cannot assume equal variance of the two populations.
A good discussion of the modified two-sample t-Test is in Law (2007).
One important thing to note is that several sources on simulation analysis prefer
confidence intervals to a hypothesis test and a p-Value approach (Law, 2007). The main
reason is that confidence intervals provide more data in terms of the magnitude of a
difference. The hypothesis test and p-Value give no indication of “how” significantly
different the two populations are. For instance, if the difference in means of the two
samples is statistically significant but only 0.02, is this difference truly, practically
significant? In addition, the analyst must use the p-Value carefully, as it has a higher
probability of showing a significance when there is none (Nuzzo, 2014).
The next statistical comparison method is the Paired t-Test. The paired-T test is
always safe to use when comparing two normally distributed system responses. There is
still a normality assumption, and the sample sizes must be equal, but there is no longer
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any assumption about the variance of the two sample populations required. The Paired tTest is useful for comparing highly correlated data.
One particularly useful technique for use in conjunction with the paired t-Test is
Common Random Numbers. Many systems are subject to a large amount of noise, or
variability due to factors outside the control of the simulation analyst. When a model
exhibits a large amount of variance, one way to help reduce the variance and thereby
make the signal in the output response more visible to the statistical tests is to induce
correlation in the simulation between scenarios/systems, and then use the paired-T test to
analyze the output. Using common random numbers (i.e., the same stream of random
number seeds to generate random numbers within each scenario) may often induce
positive correlation between the two models and reduce variance in the outputs. The
paired-T test must be used with correlated data like this. A comprehensive discussion on
the topic may be found in Law (2007) and in Banks, Carson, Nelson, and Nicol (2004).
Note that for this technique to be the most effective, the CRN must be synchronized
between each scenario. This means that for every random number draw for the same
event in each scenario, the random number draw must be on the same random number
stream. Unsynchronized CRNs may induce some correlation, but not as much as fully
synchronized random number streams. Again, for the paired-T test, and for all the
statistical tests that account for variability, confidence intervals are still preferred over the
p-Value approach.
Another comparison method for two samples from two populations is the nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. This method is useful because it measures the
spread of two populations from each other. One advantage of this is that the analyst does
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not have to assume a normally distributed response for either population. In fact, the
Wilcoxon Rank Sum works on any distribution of the tested samples. Because of this, no
assumptions about the variance is necessary. The only assumption needed to use this
method is that the two samples come from similarly distributed populations. The
interested reader can find more on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test in Wild and Seber
(1999).
One drawback for using the paired t-test, the two-sample t-test, or the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum is that they can only be used to compare two samples without making
modifications to the tests. One way to conduct a t-test comparison between several
alternative scenarios is to use all pairwise t-tests. To do so, the most appropriate
comparison involves using some method to stabilize the overall confidence level. If one
constructs confidence intervals for all pairs of alternative scenarios without adjusting the
confidence level for each simultaneous comparison, then the overall confidence level will
be incorrect. One method uses the Bonferroni inequality to adjust the individual
confidence levels of each pair of simultaneous comparisons. The procedure is
straightforward; simply divide the desired overall stated confidence level, say 0.05, by
the number of confidence intervals, c, to get the individual confidence level of each
comparison. One can see immediately that this will result in lower confidence of all the
individual comparisons, with wider intervals. This method has a reduced power to see
differences between each of the alternatives. Law (2007) has a good discussion on this
method and other pairwise methods for defining a simultaneous confidence level for
comparing multiple alternatives.
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A modification of this all-pairwise simultaneous comparison method for multiple
alternative samples is to compare all alternatives with a standard. This modification
reduces the number of pairwise simultaneous confidence intervals requiring construction,
thereby tightening the interval widths themselves and allowing more power to see
significance. To use this method, the analyst is required to identify one of the
alternatives to use as the “standard”.
Several other important methods for comparing two or more alternative
scenarios/systems are available. The Two-Stage Bonferroni procedure for comparing
two or more alternatives uses a t statistic and an estimated variance for each system
response to calculate confidence intervals of a specified precision in order to directly
compare the means of the two systems. This is a two-stage procedure in which the
analyst specifies the precision (error,𝜀), initial run number,𝑅0 > 10, and the probability
of correct selection (PCS), 1 − 𝛼, in the first stage. The analyst makes the required 𝑅0

simulation runs, estimates the variance from this initial sample of each system, and then
uses this estimate of variance to establish a required minimum number of runs, 𝑅, to

reach the specified precision for each alternative scenario. The analyst directly compares
the means of each alternative scenario’s sample after completing the additional 𝑅 − 𝑅0
runs. An excellent discussion of this method is in Banks, Carson, Nelson, and Nicol
(2004).
Another method comparing multiple scenarios is a non-parametric ranking and
selection method that makes use of the Multinomial Selection Problem. A good
discussion of this method is given in Bechhofer, Elmaghraby, and Morse (1958) and an
alternative version of the method in Miller and Nelson (1996). The method is capable of
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detecting a significant difference between two or more systems at a specified “zone of
indifference”, which can be thought of as a “practically significant difference” between
the two populations (Miller & Nelson, 1996). One drawback is that it does not detect the
magnitude of the difference between the alternative systems; it can only identify the best.
This method would be a good procedure to use for identifying the best tactical strategy of
several, where magnitude of difference may not be as important, but the fact that the
strategy increases the odds of success is important.
Designed Experiment (DOE) Approach to Simulation Analysis.
Designed experiments are conducted to maximize the amount of information
about a system obtained through a minimum number of runs. The design provides us
with appropriate statistical analysis tools that can be used to provide insight into the
dynamics of the given system. The principals of randomization, replication, and blocking
(local control of error) drive the overall design of experiments (DoE) philosophy
(Montgomery, 2009). Randomization involves randomizing the run order of each
combination of levels of the factors (treatment). Replication is the repeated measurement
of a particular treatment. Blocking is way to control nuisance factors that introduce error
into the system response measurements. Another major part of the DoE philosophy is
sequential experimentation. This principal says that the experimenter should not use all
experimentation resources in the first experiment, but rather use a fraction of the
resources and then use the results of the first experiment to inform further
experimentation (Montgomery, 2009).
One-factor-at-a-Time (OFAT) experiments are those in which all the factors are
held at a constant level while one factor’s levels are varied at any given time. This type
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of experimentation gives us information about the main effects of the factors, but does
not provide information on possible interactions or higher-order (non-linear) effects of
the factors. It is not a very efficient use of experimentation (Montgomery, 2009).
A common type of design is the 𝑘-factor, 2-level, factorial design. This design is

a cubic design that provides runs (or design points) at each of the two settings (low and

high) for each of the factors. This design type is called the 2𝑘 factorial experiment. Full

factorial designs incorporate a run at every combination of every level of each of the

factors. Figure 11 shows a cubic plot of some design points for both a 22 factorial (a)

and a 23 factorial design (b), wherein each dot at each corner point represents one run.
The design points allow estimation of the effects (what happens to the system) as each

factor moves from low to high (or vice versa) and interaction effects between the factors.
An experiment with 𝑘-factors at 2-levels each has 2𝑘 number of runs for one replication
(for example, a 22 has 2 x 2 = 4 runs of one replication of the design.)

Figure 11: Design matrix for a (a) 2 factor 2 level factorial design and (b) a 3 factor
2 level factorial design
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A full factorial experiment’s number of design points (or the number of runs
required for a single replication) grows exponentially as the number of factors involved
grows. Fractional factorial designs based on 2𝑘 full factorial design can be implemented
which cut the number of runs required by a certain fraction. Fractional factorial

experiments, or 2𝑘−𝑝 fractional factorial, also have a loss of information associated with

them due to the loss of design points. These designs can be very useful in screening,

blocking out noise factors, and can be folded over (adding runs to the original design) to
create full factorial designs when conducting sequential experimentation. Both the full
factorial and fractional designs are analyzed using analysis of variance (ANOVA)
methods. This analysis examines the variance structure to find which factors are
important in explaining the response. An in-depth discussion of 2𝑘 full factorial and
2𝑘−𝑝 fractional factorial experiments may be found in (Montgomery, 2009).

A 2𝑘 factorial design allows estimation of a first order with interaction model of

the form,

𝑘

𝑘

𝑦 = 𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + � � 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 + ε
𝑖=1

(1)

𝑖<𝑗=2

Curvature effects are estimated in order to test if there is significant curvature in the
system by adding center runs and calculating the single-degree-of-freedom sum of
squares for pure quadratic curvature given by
𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐

𝑛𝐹 𝑛𝐶 �𝑦𝐹 − 𝑦𝐶 �
=
𝑛𝐹 + 𝑛𝐶

2

(2)

Where 𝑛𝐹 is the number of factorial design points and 𝑛𝐶 is the number of center runs

conducted. Note that this method is only appropriate for continuous factors. There are
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methods available for estimating curvature in a model of mixed continuous and
categorical factors as long as at least one of the factors is continuous (Montgomery,
2009).
If there is significant curvature in the system, then a response surface should be
estimated using a second-order or higher model. A good design for estimating the
second-order model is the Central Composite Design (CCD). The CCD is created by
simply augmenting a 2𝑘 factorial design with axial runs at some distance, 𝛼, from the

center of the design, as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Augmentation of the 2k design with axial runs to form a CCD

This allows estimation of the second-order model of the form,
𝑘

𝑘

𝑖=1

𝑖=1

𝑘

𝑦 = 𝛽0 + � 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + � 𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑖2 + � � 𝛽𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 + ε

(3)

𝑖<𝑗=2

There are many other designs for estimating the response surface including the BoxBehnken 3-level designs, equiradial designs, Hoke designs, Koshal designs, Hybrid
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designs, D-, G-, and I-optimal computer generated designs, and Small Composite
designs. A good discussion of these designs can be found in (Myers, Montgomery, &
Anderson-Cook, 2009).
Mixture Experiments are response surface experiments where the factors are
components of a mixture. For instance, if a combat aircraft uses a mix of missile types,
say a medium-range missile and two types of short-range missiles, there are three mixture
factors, as there can only be so many total missiles carried by the fighter. Mixture
experiments are special in that they involve the proportions of each of the component
factors in the mix. A special coordinate system, the simplex coordinate system, is used in
these experiments instead of the standard cubic coordinate system because the sum of the
proportions of the three components always has to add to one. A diagram of the simplex
coordinate system for three components is shown at Figure 13. A four-component
simplex is a pyramid.

Figure 13: Simplex Coordinate System for three components
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As shown, any point on the system in 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 has a set of coordinates that result

in a sum of one. There are several designs for mixtures making use of the simplex

coordinate system. Simplex Lattice designs are uniformly spaced points on the simplex.
Simplex-Centroid designs have points located at the centroids of the simplices. These
designs can be augmented with axial points to provide better estimation of higher order
models. Analysis of the response surfaces is conducted using the usual ANOVA
techniques; however, there are several non-standard models of the response surface,
called the Scheffé polynomials. There are Linear, Quadratic, Full Cubic, and Special
Cubic forms of the polynomial. For more discussion of mixture designs and their
analysis, see (Myers, Montgomery, & Anderson-Cook, 2009).
If there are process variables (variables that have effects on the mixture but are
not a component of the mixture) within the system, for instance a chemical mixture
affected by temperature and pressure, there are two approaches to experimental design.
The first is to transform the mixture factors into 𝑞 − 1 independent variables, through use
of ratios, and then perform a standard experiment, such as a factorial design. The second
is to perform Simplex type experiments at the different levels of the non-mixture process
variables. In other words, perform a simplex experiment in the mixture variables at each
design point of a factorial experiment in the non-mixture variables, or perform a factorial
experiment in the non-mixture variables at each design point of the simplex experiment
of the mixture variables (Myers, Montgomery, & Anderson-Cook, 2009).
The last class of experimental designs considered for use in this study is
computer-generated designs. These designs are constructed using algorithms to optimize
the variance structure of the design. D-optimal design criteria concentrate on minimizing
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the variance of the estimated model coefficients. G-optimal designs focus on minimizing
the maximum prediction variance of the estimated model. I-optimal designs minimize
the average prediction variance of the estimated model. JMP has some very useful
algorithms for creating D-, G-, and I-optimal designs. However, care must be taken in
using computer-generated designs to ensure that the analyst understands the design being
output by the software. Several different designs and their variance structures should be
compared before choosing a particular design for implementation. A good discussion of
computer-generated designs is found in Myers, et al. (2009).
Summary
In this chapter, we surveyed literature to build a toolbox of useful methods in
helping us construct a methodology for analyzing a new missile system using an agentbased model. Simulation and modeling in the DOD walks through the types of
simulation models and several sources help us better understand the level of aggregation
and resolution required for a combat model used to analyze weapon systems. We show
that agent-based simulation models are ideal for use in analysis of complex adaptive
systems, such as air combat. There are several different potential architectures from AI
theory to provide model of agent decision making within an ABM.
AFSIM, a mission-level model ABM framework, is the tool of choice for this
research. For the scope of the problem introduced in Chapter 1, a mission level model is
appropriate. If strategic effects of using the new weapon system are sought, several
potential models could be used at the campaign level. However, we caution that analysis
of the tactical effects of a weapon system should be determined within several different
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scenarios with higher resolution models before seeking to learn what strategic effects
exist. This is primarily because the higher resolution model will yield insights directly
applicable to development of lower resolution campaign models.
Finally, we surveyed several different simulation output statistical analysis
techniques, including statistical comparison techniques and design of experiments. As is
discussed in Chapter 3, we choose to use the statistical comparison techniques for model
verification purposes and use the DoE techniques to extract more information about
factor effects on the air combat system.
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III.

Methodology

Overview
The general methodology is depicted in Figure 14. The first step is to define the
metrics used within the study and collect data. A number of sources are used for
collecting weapons data and advice on appropriate metrics including subject matter
experts from AFRL and Lockheed-Martin, Jane’s Defense Catalogues (Hewson, 2009)
(Jackson, Munson, Peacock, Bushell, & Willis, 2013) for different weapons systems
types, and various doctrinal publications and air combat tactics studies.
Using a designed experiment, the base simulation scenario is modified for each
specific combination of the levels of the factors being studied. Once the simulation
models are constructed, they are verified using graphical techniques and subject matter
experts from AFRL and Lockheed-Martin. Validation of the underlying models is an
ongoing effort by AF/A9 and AFRL and is briefly discussed in the Section 3.4.
Finally, the AFSIM simulation runs are conducted, output data parsed and
collected and then analyzed using the simulation analysis methodologies discussed in
section 3.5.
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Figure 14: Simulation Study Methodology for the Weapon System Analysis

Metrics Definition and Data Collection
The analysis plan calls for isolating the effects due to the new weapon; therefore,
many of the factors influencing air combat are held constant. For instance, all air
platforms use the same generic fire control sensor and have the same maneuverability
characteristics based on F-15-like fourth generation fighter aircraft. The main factors that
are allowed to vary across simulation scenarios are the following:
1. Number of Medium Range Air-to-air missiles loaded on Blue platforms at
mission start.
2. Number of Short Range Air-to-air missiles loaded on Blue platforms at
mission start.
3. Number of the SACM/CUDAS-like new weapon.
4. Number of Red Fighters within the scenario.
5. Tactics used by Blue flight during air-to-air engagements
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We use the first three factors to investigate different mixes of weapons and their
effects on the outcomes of a sweep-type mission. The second and third factors show the
differences between using the current AIM-9X type weapon and using the new agile type
of weapon. In the various scenario modifications, different mixes of the current medium
range missile and the SACM/CUDAS-like new weapon are investigated, from no SACMall MRM to no MRM-all SACM initial mission loads. Two different replacement ratios
are investigated: replacing every one MRM/SRM with two CUDAS-like missiles (2:1
ratio); replacing every one MRM/SRM with three CUDAS-like missiles (3:1 ratio).
Table 1 shows the carrying capacities for the different types of weapons on an F-15E.
The chosen scenario uses a fighter platform that is similar to the F-15E (fourth generation
fighter aircraft) for both the Blue and Red sides. Data for the fourth generation fighter
model comes from Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft (Jackson, Munson, Peacock, Bushell,
& Willis, 2013). From Table 1, it is immediately apparent that no combination of the
weapons will exceed the maximum weapon load weight. For the simulation, the fighters
will have the capacity to carry eight MRM/SRM or the appropriate number of CUDAS
missiles shown if the entire load out is only one type of air-to-air missile. Additionally,
the Blue fighters always carry two air-to-ground weapons. The MRM is modeled as an
AIM-120 AMRAAM; the SRM as an AIM-9X Sidewinder; and the air-to-ground weapon
is modeled as the GBU-38,500lb variant JDAM. Note that each of these weapons is not
modeled exactly, due to classification issues, but rather is modeled based on open-source
material found in Jane’s Air Launched Weapons (Hewson, 2009).
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Table 1: Weapon Carrying Capacities for the F-15E-like platform
Kilograms
11113

Pounds
Max. Wpn Load
24500
CUDAS
CUDAS
MRM/SRM
(2:1 Ratio) (3:1 ratio)
Number Wpn Pylons
8
16
24
Weapon

Weight (kg)

Medium Range
Short Range
CUDAS-like
JDAM-like

161
85
49
227

Proportion
Max
of Max.
Number
0.01449
69
0.00765
130
0.00441
226
0.02043
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We vary the number of Red aircraft that Blue must face in order to investigate
how the Blue systems work under different difficulty levels, easy to hard. The number of
Red aircraft is varied from four, six, to eight total aircraft flying CAP missions in pairs at
different locations along the Blue attack route. All Red aircraft have the same fire control
sensors and maneuverability as the Blue aircraft in order to isolate as much as possible
the effects on tactics and mission success due strictly to the introduction of the new
missile system. Red aircraft are only armed with a standard combat air patrol weapon
load and do not have their weapons varied over the scenarios.
Blue tactics are investigated by changing the range of tactics available to the
pilots (agents) from scenario to scenario. As discussed previously, there are generally
two phases of tactics in air combat, Beyond Visual Range (BVR) tactics, and Within
Visual Range (WVR) tactics. BVR tactics tend to influence WVR tactics (Baker, 1986).
BVR tactics available to use before the merge are single-side offset, straight-in, lead/trail,
and pincer. The single-side offset tactic, shown in Figure 15, involves the flight lead
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moving the entire flight off-axis of the approaching enemy aircraft, usually up to 30
degrees. This gives the flight the ability to attack at a more oblique angle to the incoming
enemy.

Figure 15: Single Side Offset Maneuver at BVR

Straight-in is a tactic, Figure 16, which means the flight flies straight at the
incoming enemy. A flight usually uses this tactic when the flight lead feels that friendly
weapons and fighters have superior range and maneuverability against the perceived
enemy fighter/weapon types.

Figure 16: Straight-In maneuver at BVR
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A flight uses the Lead/Trail tactic to avoid merging, or coming to WVR, as long
as possible. One pair of the Blue flight moves straight-in and fires weapons at BVR,
while the other pair loops backwards to maintain standoff and then fires their weapons at
BVR while the first set of Blue fighters conduct the loop back. The Lead/Trail maneuver
is illustrated with a flight of two in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Lead/Trail maneuver at BVR

Finally, the pincer tactic, Figure 18 , splits the Blue flight. Each half of the flight
maneuvers wide of the incoming enemy and comes into the approaching enemy flight at a
maximum flanking angle (or Target Aspect Angle (TAA)) in order to attempt to get
behind the enemy fighters. This tactic provides the best setup for follow-on into WVR
engagement.
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Figure 18: Pincer tactic with a flight of two Blue aircraft at BVR

For the purposes of this study, the focus of BVR tactics is on pincer and straightin. WVR tactics are modeled using a simple decision engine that keeps the Blue fighter
outside of the Red fighter’s Weapon Employment Zone (WEZ), while attempting to
maneuver the Blue fighter to a point that the Red fighter is within the Blue fighter’s
WEZ. Finally, BVR engagements typically begin 60 to 80 nautical miles from the targets
and continue up to about 10 nautical miles from the targets, where the engagement then
becomes classified as a WVR engagement (Houck, Whitaker, & Kendall, 1993).
Table 2 is a summary of the factors investigated in this air combat model and their
operational ranges. Note that Blue Tactics is a categorical factor and the rest of the
factors, though numeric, are discrete. This has implications for the analysis of the
simulation outputs.
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Table 2: Summary of the study factors’ operational ranges
Factors
Num. MRM (per Blue agent)
Num. SRM (per Blue agent)
Num. CUDAS (2:1) (per Blue
Agent)
Num. CUDAS (3:1) (per Blue
agent)
Num. Red fighters
Blue Tactics

Low
0
0

Central
4
4

High
8
8

0

8

16

0

12

24

4
Straight-In

6
N/A

8
Pincer

Table 3 summarizes the main measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used in this
study and provides the expected ranges of the responses.
Table 3: Measures of Effectiveness (Responses) of the Simulation Calculation and
Expected Value
Expected Range
AFSIM Output Metrics To
Calculate MOE

MOE

Name

MOE 1

Time to Service Target Set

Average Simulation Time;
PLATFORM_KILLED

MOE 2

% Target Set Destroyed

Number Initial Red Targets;
PLATFORM_KILLED

MOE 3

Weapon Effectiveness

Number Weapons Fired;
Number Tgts Destroyed

MOE 4

Standoff of Engagements Avg. Engage Distance;

MOE 5

Blue Vulnerability

Avg. Number of Hits by Red

MOE 6

Engagement Results

Qualitative Engagement
outcome

Low

High

Remarks

30 min

120 min

Range is for the approx. 2
hour sweep scenario

80%

100%

1

2

Num Wpns Fired divided
by Num Tgts Destroyed

Expect that most air
20 nm
10 nm
engagements occur at
(37 km) (18.5 km)
BVR

0

Engage
WVR

10

The combination of
tactics and weapons is
expected to increase or
decrease the vulnerability
of a fighter in air combat.

Engage Expect that Blue attempts
BVR
to stay at BVR

Data Collection Plan.
The first step in analyzing the AFSIM output data is parsing the output files into
quantified measures. For this purpose, we developed a post processor that works on the
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comma delimited output files of AFSIM. The AFSIM Post Processor, based on Excel
with R script functions, provides a way to pull specific measures out of the data and
collect them into a more usable data structure. It also provides a summary data file that
calculates averages, confidence intervals, medians, minimums, and maximums over all
the simulation runs of one particular scenario or system.

Figure 19: AFSIM Post Processor Ribbon Options
Before making production runs, AFSIM must be configured correctly to output
the comma delimited files (file extension .csv) to a folder of the analyst’s choosing. We
output all these comma delimited files to a separate folder under the same folder structure
as the AFSIM scenario definition script files and name the output folder “output”.
Within AFSIM, the commands to output the .csv files are contained in the following
AFSIM script block in the main script (or startup) file (Figure 20):
event_csvoutput
relative_directory output/run%d/
file_extension csv
end_event_csvoutput
Figure 20: AFSIM Output Setup Script for Comma Delimited File Output

The relative directory designates the path to the run output folders. For the
AFSIM Post Processor R script to work correctly, the “run%d” must be specified exactly
as shown. In the AFSIM script above, the %d tells AFSIM to create a folder named
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“run[run number]” and then place the output .csv files from that particular run in them. If
this is incorrectly specified, AFSIM will overwrite the files every time the simulation
runs. The analyst can also specify events to output into the files. See the AFSIM wiki
included in the AFSIM files for complete details on using the event_output block and
how to enable output events. Figure 46, in Appendix A, is an example of one of the .csv
output files, the WeaponTerminated_Data.csv file. There are actually 45 columns of data
in this file, so we remove some of them for brevity. The AFSIM output contains many
different .csv files and all are formatted differently.
After conducting the required runs of the different scenarios based on the analysis
plan, the analyst must parse the AFSIM output files to extract the required information
for analysis.
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Figure 21: AFSIM Post Processor output parser execution flow

R scripts, called by the AFSIM post processor through Excel visual basic macros,
conduct this post processing to parse the AFSIM output files (R Core Team, 2014). The
flow of the program is presented in Figure 21. The post processor guides the analyst
through selecting the location of the AFSIM .csv output files. To begin, the analyst just
clicks on the “Process New Scenario Output” button in the Excel Ribbon (as shown in
Figure 19). Then the open dialogue box appears and the analyst can select the location of
the output files, as shown in Figure 22.
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Figure 22: Open Folder dialog that allows selection of the AFSIM output file
location

The AFSIM Post Processor works by reading each of these .csv files into the R
environment in the form of a data frame, which is a special data structure in R formatted
much like a matrix, but has special attributes and methods useful for data manipulation.
Once the files have been put into the correct format for R, the post processor displays a
dialogue box that allows selection of the responses, platforms, weapon types, and target
types to parse the output data by as shown in Figure 23.
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Figure 23: Parse data selection - All platform, weapon type, and target type names
are extracted directly from data; Response Measures are pre-programmed.
Currently the post processor is limited to just these three of the AFSIM commadelimited output file types (WeaponTerminated_Data, WeaponFired_Data, and
Platform_Data), but can easily be expanded to read in any of the files containing response
data of interest from AFSIM.
The post processing script then uses the analyst’s choices for responses and parses
the data for all the combinations of the chosen platform, weapon, and target type of
interest, with the resulting detailed data frame formatted as in Figure 24 below:

Firing.Platform
Wpn.Type
air_interceptor_3_ aa_mrm
air_interceptor_3_ aa_mrm
air_interceptor_3_ ALL
Blue_2
hel

Target
STRIKER-LWS
ALL
ALL
AA_MRM

Stat.Name
Run
WEAPON_FIRED
WEAPON_FIRED
WEAPON_FIRED
WEAPON_FIRED

Value
1
1
1
1

6
6
6
9

Half.Width Variance Median
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Figure 24: Detailed Data Frame Created by the AFSIM R Post Processing Script
Where the Firing.Platform is the platform of interest, the Wpn.Type is the
weapon type fired by the platform, Target is the platform’s target for that engagement,
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0
0
0
0

and Stat.Name is the response variable of interest. The post processor calculates most of
the measures by simply sub-setting the appropriate data frame and counting the number
of observations, using different variations of the following R command. Note that the +
symbols at the start of a new line just indicate to R that the new line is actually a part of
the original line; in other words the entire command in Figure 25 may be written on one
line with the + symbols excluded:

>

detailedData$Value <- nrow(subset(frameName, subset =

+ (platform

== p & wpnType == w & Target.Type == t & run

+ == i & event == e)))
Figure 25: R "nrow" Function Example Syntax for Counting Event Occurrences of
a Certain Subset

The “nrow” function used in conjunction with the “subset” function does most of
the work. The Half.Width column is a 95% confidence interval half-width for the
particular data measure. Not all measures will yield a confidence interval, because they
do not have ‘within replication’ variance.
Once the program creates the detailed data frame from the analyst’s choices, the
post processor script saves it to a location and name of the analyst’s choosing.
To calculate summary data across replications, the post processor uses a function
to summarize the data contained in the detailed data frame. The output from the
summary function shows the roll up of each of the measures across all the runs of the
simulation conducted. The output “summaryData” data frame is formatted the same as
the “detailedData” data frame but includes the columns min and max. An example of the
format is shown in Figure 26.
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Firing.Platform
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2
Blue_2

Wpn.Type
sdm
sdm
sdm
sdm
sdm
sdm
sdm
sdm

Target
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR
AIR_INTERCEPTOR

Stat.Name
WEAPON_FIRED
WEAPON_HIT
WEAPON_MISSED
WEAPON_TERMINATED
Avg Engage Distance
Avg_Engage_Altitude
Avg_Engage_Relative_Altitude
Number Of Targets Destroyed

Average
5
2.825
1.4666667
5
35667.464
12871.665
-598.9508
2.625

Half.Width Variance
Median Max
Min
0.79806751
12.86075949
4.5
10
0
0.45863944
4.247468354
3
7
0
0.30255767
1.371751412
1
5
0
0.79806751
12.86075949
4.5
10
0
2486.97068
28237281.63 33577.97 49023.91 29822.75
100.61777
46220.1052 12921.6 13138.39 12289.14
294.511295
395991.1374 -180.629 -152.266 -2101.7
0.44560606
4.009493671
3
7
0

Figure 26: Summary Output Data data-frame format

Currently the post processor only parses the AFSIM output for the factors:
Platform, Weapon Type, and Target Type. In addition, the post processor only calculates
the responses: WEAPON_FIRED, WEAPON_HIT, WEAPON_MISSED,
WEAPON_TERMINATED, Average Engagement Distance, Average Engagement
Altitude, Average Relative Engagement Altitude, Number of Targets Destroyed,
Simulation Time that Platform is destroyed (if destroyed), and Average Miss Distance of
Weapons (Hits and Misses).
Other measures, such as First Detect, are easily added if the analyst specifies the
associated events for output in the .csv output files from AFSIM. Some measures must
be parsed out of the flat text files (such as Behavior Tree data), rather than the commadelimited files, because AFSIM simply does not yet output those events to the .csv files
(see the AFSIM wiki page on event_output). However, AFSIM Version 1.8 does have an
included Behavior Tree tool, called GRIT (Graphical RIPR Interface Tool), which
provides a tree visualization and a time slider to show which behaviors are active at what
simulation times for a particular run of the simulation scenario (shown in Figure 27).
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Figure 27: AFSIM 1.8 Behavior Tree Visualization Tool, Graphical RIPR Interface
Tool (GRIT)

Simulation Scenario
The combat model scenario is an offensive counter-air sweep of a mission area,
which takes place in a theoretical country. Much of this scenario definition comes from
the previous work of Charles River Analytics for the “Situational Awareness Model for
Pilot-in-the-Loop Evaluation” with some minor variations (Mulgund, Harper, Guarino, &
Zacharias, 1999). Specifically, we adjust the number of agents on both the Blue and Red
sides for the purposes of this study.
The general scenario description is one flight of two Blue fighters have the
mission to clear an area by moving to contact with enemy fighters in order to support a
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follow-on strike on a deep target. The strike mission objective can be a highway bridge
or factory or some other type of high value target. Along the route, the fighters may
encounter enemy air threats or enemy air defense threats and will work to eliminate these
threats so that follow-on bombers can destroy the objective.
AFSIM Scenario Implementation.
The simulation is run in the AFSIM framework, a mission-level combat modeling
simulation framework. AFSIM scripting files use AFSIM commands to control the
simulation execution, call specific models, and define the platforms and the environment
in which the platforms exist. For this simulation scenario, the files are categorized into
different overall categories and stored within folders of that category. Figure 28 depicts a
snapshot of the project browser pane of the AFSIM integrated development environment
(IDE). The IDE is the tool that is used to interact with the various code files.
Much of the AFSIM scenario files are adapted from the work of the Air Force
Research Laboratory’s Sweep Mission Scenario for the Spartacus Study (Geaslen &
Panson, 2014).
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Figure 28: AFSIM Simulation Scenario Scripting Folder Structure

The main simulation control file that starts up the simulation and controls the
execution of the simulation is shown in Figure 28 as “1st_run.txt”. This file tells AFSIM
where to find the main scenario file, the setup file, and the event output file. The file also
carries commands on the number of runs, location to put the output files, random number
generation, and variable definition. The main scenario file is located in the “scenarios”
folder and contains the commands to instantiate specific instances of platforms, their
locations, and routes. The “config” folder contains the setup file, the event output file
and the terrain file. The setup file gives AFSIM the paths to critical files as well as
commands to “include” all the script files necessary to run the simulation. The event
output file tells AFSIM which events to record in the output files. The terrain script file
includes references to any terrain files, such as Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED)
files, used in the simulation. For our scenario, we chose to use no terrain to help simplify
factor interactions. Figure 29 is an example of the AFSIM commands included in the
“1st_run.txt” startup file.
59

define_path_variable CASE 1st_run
log_file output/$(CASE).log
# setup file includes the platforms
include config/setup.txt
include config/event_output.txt
# Select one of these scenarios to run
#include scenarios/Scenario-Striker-LWS.txt
#include scenarios/Scenario-Striker-SDM.txt
include scenarios/Scenario-Striker-Base.txt

event_output file output/$(CASE).evt end_event_output
dis_interface
record output/$(CASE)%d.rep
mover_update_timer 5.0 s
suppress_directed_energy_data on
end_dis_interface

event_csvoutput
relative_directory output/run%d/
file_extension csv
end_event_csvoutput

final_run_number 5
random_seed 234546 #used for one iteration
generate_random_seeds 367 #used to generate a stream of random seeds for
each run using the same base seed up to the final_run_number
end_time 120 minutes

Figure 29: Example Startup File for the AFSIM Simulation Control

A # character indicates comments. Script blocks always include an “end”
statement. AFSIM commands are bold and usually followed by a setting in light text.
The AFSIM scripting language also includes all the basic programming control structures
such as for and while loops and if-then statements as well as model specific commands.
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The rest of the file structure includes all the class files that define classes of
platforms, weapons, sensors, and weapons. Because AFSIM is object oriented in nature,
each of the script files is, in essence, a definition of a class of objects, which are then
instantiated in other class definitions or in the simulation scenario file as specific
instances of that object. This gives great flexibility to the simulation developer in that a
platform, or any other type of object, needs only be coded once in a class definition.
Then multiple instances of that platform, say multiple Blue fighters, can be specified in
the scenario file or in another class definition. Specific instances of an object can have
attributes set specific to that instance or even have attributes added that do not exist in the
base class of that object.
In Figure 28, the “site_types” folder contains all the “intelligent” agent processor
class definitions used for Blue agent decision making. The “decision-making” processors
for the Red agents are contained in the “processors” folder. The rest of the folders are
self-explanatory.
Figure 30 shows a screen shot from the Visual Environment for Scenario
Preparation and Analysis (VESPA) playback visualization utility that shows a particular
run of the simulation graphically. This playback utility, included in the base AFSIM
distribution, is useful in conducting verification and validation as will be discussed later.
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Figure 30: VESPA Playback Snapshot of Simulation Run of AFSIM scenario

The VESPA utility is also useful in development of a scenario as it allows
graphical placement of platforms and drawing of routes. As is shown, Figure 30 shows
the routes programmed for the Blue fighters to take. Because this is a playback of an
actual simulation run, there is scripting code included in the files that draws line objects
to show the routes as the respective agents fly. These lines disappear as the Blue agents
react to the various Red platforms and then reappear as the Blue agents move back onto
the planned routes making it easy to tell when the agents use the “planned-route”
behavior. The view within VESPA can be zoomed, panned and rotated to view different
actions from different angles.
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Blue Agent Decision Making Behavior.
The fighters have several planned courses of action (i.e., primary, secondary,
tertiary) for ingress, sweep, and egress from the mission objective area. Throughout the
mission, each agent goes through several different states. Each agent can be in a search
state, looking for possible threats and targets. Search happens on both ingress and egress.
The agent moves to a detection state upon target identification. The engagement state is
when the agent selects a weapon and fires at the detected target. Finally, each agent
conducts a defensive reaction if the agent detects an incoming threat.
AFSIM includes a pilot mental model, the Reactive Integrated Planning
aRchitecture (RIPR), that uses job boards and behavior trees to provide an artificial
intelligence framework for creating flexible agent behaviors in reaction to the simulation
environment (Zeh & Birkmire, 2014). Job boards are essentially tasking algorithms that
allow a commander agent to allocate different sensor tracks as “tasks” to subordinates for
engagement. The algorithm performs a weapon-target assignment and passes a task to
the designated subordinates. The “quantum-tasker processor” is the object that
implements this task creation (generation), evaluation and allocation. Figure 31 depicts
the flow of the agent decision making from the sensing of a possible track to assignment
of the task to a Blue agent and then evaluation by the Blue agent’s Behavior Tree. The
Behavior Tree is discussed later in this section.
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Figure 31: Blue Agent Decision Making Architecture within the RIPR model in
AFSIM

For this scenario, the quantum-tasker processor implemented within the Flight
Lead agent creates simple weapons tasks from every track perceived by the Blue agents’
sensors. The Evaluator script then takes each task and evaluates it against each
subordinate asset. The quantum-tasker processor is set to define assets as subordinate
agents to the Flight Lead. Finally, the Allocator uses the value developed for each assettask pair to find the optimal allocation of tasks and then assign those tasks to the assets.
Each weapons task is evaluated per asset by finding the maximum value weapon
carried on that asset against that task. The pseudo-code is shown in Figure 32. The
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heuristic considers the closeness of the target to the asset, the probability of hit/kill for the
asset’s weapon versus the specific target, and the effective range of each weapon on the
asset.
Initialize all variables;
Value = 0;
RangeToTarget = SlantRangeTo(EnemyTrack);
WVRdistance = 10 Nautical Miles;
For each weapon on asset i
Value = Value + (1/(RangeToTarget/WVRdistance));
Value = Value + WeaponPSSK;
#PSSK = Probability Single Shot Kill
If Target is within range of weapon
Value = Value + 1;
Endif
If Target is WVRdistance and weapon is a short range
weapon
Value = Value + 1;
Endif
If Target is an aircraft and is outside of the mission
area
Value = 0;

# Target is removed as a feasible target

Endif
End For Loop

Figure 32: Pseudo-Code for Evaluator heuristic rules

The allocator within the quantum tasker processor runs once every ten simulation
seconds. Each time the allocator runs, it calls the evaluator for every asset (agent) – task
(target) pair. There are several allocator algorithms pre-built into the RIPR quantum
model. The scenario implemented in this study uses a custom algorithm to provide the
asset-task assignment. The allocation algorithm fully enumerates the possible solutions
to the assignment of asset to tasks and then picks the largest valued combination of the
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assignments. The algorithm also prevents assets from executing the same targets. The
pseudo-code is shown in Figure 33.
Initialize variables – TempTotalValue = 0, MaxTotalValue = 0;
For each asset_task_value I

#iterate over every combination of tasks

For each asset_task_value j
If i not equal to j #Disallow assets assigned same task
TempTotalValue = asset_task_value i +
asset_task_value j;
If TempTotalValue > MaxTotalValue
MaxTotalValue = TempTotalValue; #Find the
largest value
If the value of any of the tasks in the
asset_task combination = 0
The target has no value, cancel the task;
Endif
Endif
Endif
End for loop
End for loop

Figure 33: Allocator Custom Full Enumeration Pseudo-code

As discussed in Chapter 2, Behavior Trees are a rule-based set of reactive
behaviors built in a tree form that allow flexible entity behaviors. The Behavior Tree
developed for this scenario is depicted in Figure 34.
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Figure 34: Agent Behavior Tree for the Sweep Mission Scenario

On every update, or scheduled evaluation of the tree, the root node fires,
attempting to execute all of its child behaviors. The “Fly” node, being a select node,
attempts to select one of its children for running. The node starts on the left and stops as
soon as it reaches a subordinate node that returns running or true. In this way, the
“Evade” sub-behavior gets a priority evaluation. Inside the “Evade” sequence node, the
node attempts to run the subordinate nodes from left to right in sequence. If a
subordinate returns false, the “Evade” node returns false and cannot run. If the situation
meets the “Incoming Threat” pre-condition, then the node moves to the “Maneuver”
select node, which attempts to select one of the four basic behaviors available to it. The
basic behaviors are simply scripts written in AFSIM’s scripting language (a high-level
language similar to C++) that execute some action. If the action is impossible to execute,
given the current state of the environment and the fighter, that action will return false.
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The “Maneuver” select node then moves on to the next basic behavior to attempt that
action and continues until it reaches a behavior that executes or returns false as unable to
execute any subordinate behaviors.
In this manner, the “Fly” node tries each of its subordinates. Note that the Ingress
and Egress Nodes, depending on the location of the fighter and the overall state of the
simulation, will always be able to fire. These nodes become the “default” for the “Fly”
node.
Simultaneously, the root node is trying to run the “Engagement” sub-behavior.
This behavior fires the weapon assigned to the current target. If the weapon cannot be
fired (the target is outside the Weapon Employment Zone (WEZ)) of the weapon or the
target’s flight characteristics make the track quality or probability of kill for the weapon
too low), the node returns false and the weapon does not fire.
Red Force Composition and Behavior Engine.
The Red side within the simulation consists of fighters and air defense vehicles
carrying surface-to-air missiles on the ground. Red aircraft each carry the same firecontrol sensor and have the same fourth-generation fighter flight characteristics as the
Blue aircraft. Weapons compliment consists of four medium range missiles and six
short-range missiles, which is consistent with current defensive counter-air (DCA)
mission load outs. The missiles themselves are the same type as carried by Blue in the
baseline weapon configuration. The number of Red fighters varies within the range of
two to six total fighters flying in pairs throughout the sweep mission area. After initial
analysis, we adjust the range of number of Red fighters from four to eight, as we discuss
in more detail in chapter 4. There are three types of Red air defense systems within the
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scenarios: long-range, short-range, and medium-range SAMs. Each is kept at a fixed
level across all the scenarios: one Long-range, two short-range, and one medium-range
SAM. The Red decision-making engine driving Red behaviors uses the AFSIM Finite
State Machine model for entity behaviors. Figure 35 shows the four possible states that
each Red agent can be in at any time. The baseline behavior is to conduct preprogrammed Patrol/Search behavior, such as follow a route. Once a radar track is
established, the agent moves to the detected state. In the detected state, the agent
maneuvers towards the target in order to make the target engage-able.

Figure 35: Finite State Machine Diagram for Red Agents (Four Possible States)
Scenario Summary

Once the track is determined to be an enemy track, the agent moves to the engageable state in which the script checks if the track meets the engagement criteria (position,
altitude, speed, etc.), or in other words whether the track is in the engagement zone of the
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Red agent’s weapon. If engage-able, the agent moves into the Engage state and attempts
to fire its weapon at the target track. At any time, the logic in the state machine allows
the agent to move back and forth between the states according to the diagram in Figure
35.
Scenario Summary.
This scenario offers several advantages for analyzing different weapon systems.
One advantage is that previous research provides a detailed definition of this scenario
(Mulgund, Harper, Guarino, & Zacharias, 1999). Another is that it offers a framework
within which to test several very different kinds of agents against each other using the
same behavioral architecture for each agent or different behavioral architectures for each
agent. Finally, different weapons systems and platforms can be added and subtracted
quickly, creating different scenarios within which to show agent actions under the
different behavioral architectures.
Data on tactical behavior is gathered by using the GRIT visualization interface to
gather information on which behaviors are used and how often. This information details
how implementing the new weapon within the simulated air combat scenario influences
the agent choice of behavior.
Verification and Validation
We conducted verification visually using the VESPA playback utility as well as
analytically using a check of the output data. This is a time consuming process and
requires sampling from individual scenarios. Visually, the analyst must check that the
agents execute the tactics correctly and in the correct context. Checking the data, several
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questions are asked: “Are all data factors being populated?”, “Are the output numbers
realistic given the scenario?” and “Are there any questionable output numbers?”. Many
times errors can be found quickly, but finding the underlying causes requires a systematic
trial and error approach to correcting the simulation code. Verification of the response
surface model achieved with the designed experiment is an additional technique. The
analyst randomly conducts confirmatory runs on predicted values at several different
settings of the factors. If the responses fall within a statistical prediction interval of the
predicted value, the model is performing satisfactorily.
We complete validation of the simulation model in this study chiefly through
subject matter expert (SME) analysis. We conduct our simulation runs and then have
SMEs from AFRL/RQ and Lockheed examine key outputs, including some of the
visualizations and provide feedback on agent behaviors and weapons performance.
As of the writing of this paper, HAF/A9 and AFRL are conducting a more indepth validation for the underlying combat models within AFSIM. HAF/A9 is evaluating
AFSIM for possible inclusion of the framework into the Air Force Standard Analysis
Tool Kit (AFSAT).
Analysis Plan
The analysis of the weapon system using this simulation scenario is undertaken
using a designed experiment approach, described in more detail in Chapter 4. The main
steps of the execution of the analysis follow:
1. Develop and run separate simulation scenarios for a specified number of
iterations for each design point, or treatment combination, in the designed
experiment matrix. This step generates the data for analysis. We extract the
data using the AFSIM post processor.
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2. Conduct initial analysis using qualitative visualization analysis of each separate
simulation scenario. The initial analysis yields insights about tactics used,
efficiency, and effectiveness of the different weapon systems involved.
3. Conduct ANOVA and construct a statistical model using the designed
experiment treatment combinations. The model yields statistically valid and
useful insights about the contribution of each factor (number of weapons by
type, number of Red agents, and tactics used) as well as the significance.
4. Summarize and report the results.

Summary
The overall methodology of this study is to use an agent-based simulation,
AFSIM, to investigate the effects of using a new air-to-air missile in air combat. We
have described the tactics used in BVR air engagements and developed specific metrics
for use in analyzing the weapons system. The scenario used in this study is specifically a
sweep mission, but there are many other scenarios that could be investigated, for
instance, the Defensive Counter Air, Suppression of Enemy Air Defense, Deep
Interdiction, and others. The sweep mission is chosen because it is well defined,
accessible, and has all the elements of both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat that allow
sufficient exploration of the main factors of interest.
We provide many of the technical details of AFSIM here in order to show by
what method intelligent agents may be configured to simulate air combat. A somewhat
simplistic weapon-target assignment algorithm is used for the higher-level cognitive
functions of a flight leader. Algorithms and heuristics exist that are more efficient and an
approximate solution heuristic may even be preferable, given that we are modeling
human decision-making, but are beyond the scope of this thesis. A reactive, rule-based
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behavioral framework, Behavior Trees, are used to model Blue agent actions within the
air combat environment, while Red agent actions are governed by a finite state machine.
The BTs allow actions that are more complex and a certain degree of cooperation
between the Blue agents that provides more realistic agent decision-making behavior.
Finally, the heart of the analysis is the designed experiment approach. Initial
insights are gained by a “quick-turn” review of the resulting run data using both
visualization and statistical techniques, but the statistical model constructed from the
experimental treatment combinations data provides additional insights pertaining to the
relevance and significance of the experiment factors to the complex system of air combat.
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IV.

Analysis

Overview
This chapter details the analysis results of our evaluation of the data obtained
from a designed experiment using the simulation scenario described previously. The
logic behind the experiment design is to provide insight into which factors are producing
significant effects and a general idea of the direction of those effects, as well as how the
factors interact with each other, to produce the observed effects in the air combat
scenario. The designed experiment (DOE) approach provides a clearer picture of the
effects of mixing weapons and the extent of involvement that different tactics have within
the combat scenario. Ultimately, this analysis is designed to give insights that help
answer the initial questions we start with in Chapter 1. The DOE approach we use here is
a screening design. Ideally, this initial experimentation is used as a basis for further
simulation experimentation based on the insights gained.
Designed Experiment Analysis.
We consider several experimental designs due to the unique nature of the factors
involved in this analysis. The carrying capacity of the aircraft on which the weapons are
carried limits the first three factors, number of each type of air-to-air missile used. The
interaction between each of the other missiles carried also limits the number of a specific
missile carried, as well. For example, if eight MRMs are carried on an F-15, then no
other air-to-air missiles can be carried. Furthermore, these factors are discrete in the
sense that a fractional missile is not logical. These three factors represent a mixture. The
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number of Red aircraft is also discrete. We choose to limit the choice of tactic used to a
categorical variable; the tactic is either pincer or straight-in, in order to show the effects
of completely distinguishable tactical courses of action. This set of factor characteristics
makes the choice of experimental design somewhat complicated.
Two designs are considered: a mixture design of the three missile factors
combined with a full 22 factorial screening design and a computer generated D-optimal

design with imposed constraints that treats the missile factors as non-mixture factors and

prohibits infeasible mixtures three missiles. We discuss each design briefly, but choose
to use the computer generated D-optimal design, which does not use a mixture design.
The first design, a mixture design in conjunction with a full factorial screening
design involves conducting a mixture simplex experiment for the three missile factors at
each of the points of the factorial screening experiment, where each factorial point
represents a different combination of the factor levels of the two non-mixture factors,
number of Red aircraft and tactic used. This design has the advantage of being the most
transparent in terms of comprehension due to the design construction method. This
design also has a decent variance structure. However, it has several disadvantages. First,
the mixture design/full-factorial combination requires a large number of design points.
(Approximately seven design points for each mixture multiplied by six points for each
point in the 22 factorial plus two center runs is 42 total design points.) Each design point

in AFSIM must be a separately programmed and run scenario because AFSIM does not

have an experimental engine to allow changing variables between simulation runs during
runtime. Additionally, this design has a troublesome aliasing structure, meaning that
some effects are confounded within the design. Finally, the mixture design requires
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continuous factors. The mixture design can be adjusted to accommodate our discrete
missile factors, but this results in a non-optimal variance structure.
The next design, which is the design used in this analysis, is a computer generated
D-optimal design with designated “disallowed” points. The disallowed points are the
infeasible combinations of the missile factors (i.e., 8 MRM with 8 SRM, etc.). Computer
software is used to generate the design and conduct analysis on the outputs, specifically
JMP 10.0 (SAS Institute Inc., 1989-2007). The computer software uses a constrained
optimization technique to generate a design with the least amount of design points
required for the designated factors with an optimal variance structure. In this case, we
use the D-optimal criteria, which seek to minimize the variance of the model parameter
estimates within the design region. Although the variance structure of this design is not
as desirable as the mixture/factorial design, this design has fewer numbers of points and a
better aliasing structure, meaning that effects are more readily apparent because they are
only partially aliased with other effects, as compared with the mixture/factorial design.
The final design matrix used for this analysis is in Table 4. One last note, the design in
Table 4 is a single replicate. For this analysis, we conduct twenty replicates of each of
the eighteen design points to provide a solid measure of error.
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Table 4: JMP Generated Custom D-Optimal Screening Design
Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Number of
MRM
0
4
2
0
2
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
2
2

Number of SRM
0
0
2
4
0
2
0
4
0
4
2
0
0
0
0
0
2
0

Number of
CUDAS
0
0
0
0
4
4
0
0
8
0
4
8
0
0
8
0
0
4

Number of Red
Fighters
4
4
4
6
6
6
8
8
8
4
4
4
6
6
6
8
8
8

Blue Tactic Used
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Pincer
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In
Straight-In

Simulation Scenario Analysis Results.
The above experimental design is applied using the scenario described in Chapter
3. From the simulation output data, we construct a statistical model for each MOE that
allows us to look at the significance of the effects of each of the factors as well as
determine some mean values with 95% prediction intervals.
In its current configuration, there are two possibilities for the ratio of CUDA to
MRM/SRM that can be replaced on the standard weapons rails of fourth generation
aircraft. Each weapon rail can carry either two CUDA missiles or three CUDA missiles
as opposed to just one MRM or SRM. In order to build statistical models that accurately
reflect the changes in the MOEs due to the changes in the levels of the number of each
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type of missile carried, it is necessary to adjust the scale of number of total missiles
available in the scenario versus the number of Red aircraft targets in the scenario. In an
effort to keep this scenario as simple as possible, we limited the number of Red aircraft to
a maximum of eight. Although fourth generation aircraft may carry up to eight
MRM/SRM, or sixteen CUDA in a two to one replacement scheme, this provides an
overmatch in capability to number of targets. In other words, it is difficult to assess if
changing the number of CUDA from sixteen per Blue aircraft to eight per Blue aircraft is
having any effect. At a maximum, there are only eight targets. The Blue side may have
up to thirty-two total missiles (sixteen missiles on two Blue aircraft). Our solution was to
decrease the number of missiles available, but maintain the ratios. We limited the
number of MRMs or SRMs available to four per Blue aircraft, as shown in Table 5. This
means a maximum of eight CUDA for a two to one replacement scheme.

Table 5: Summary of the study factors’ re-scaled operational ranges
Factors
Num. MRM (per Blue agent)
Num. SRM (per Blue agent)
Num. CUDAS (2:1) (per Blue
Agent)
Num. Red fighters
Blue Tactics

Low
0
0

Central
2
2

High
4
4

0

4

8

4
Straight-In

6
N/A

8
Pincer

Assessing a three to one replacement scheme requires an addition of many more
Red aircraft, which is beyond the scope of our stated simple analysis scenario. This in
itself shows a potential benefit of having a smaller, lighter missile: increased cargo
capacity. This benefit is discussed further in a later section.
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CUDA 2 to 1 Replacement Scenarios.
MOE1 Time to Service Target Set.
As discussed in Chapter 1, MOE 1 is measured at the time that both Blue agents
arrive at a specific point in space, the end of the sweep route, without moving back into
the sweep area to engage any surviving Red agents. The ANOVA for this measure is
shown at Table 6.

Table 6: ANOVA for MOE1: Time To Service Target Set (JMP Generated Output
Table)
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
Source

DF
7

Model

Squares
1.37604e-6

Error

352

3.70675e-7

C. Total

359

1.74671e-6

Mean Square
1.9658e-7
1.0531e-9

F Ratio
186.6734
Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
DF

NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

NumSRM(0,4)

F Ratio

1

Squares
9.7407e-10

1

1

1.51327e-8

14.3703

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

1

1.08828e-8

10.3345

NumRedFighters(4,8)
BlueTactics

1

1

1.5821e-10

1

1

1.09907e-6

NumSRM*NumSRM

1

1

5.02142e-9

4.7684

0.6985
<.0001 *
0.0296 *

NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

1

1

6.57629e-9

6.2450

0.0129 *

Source

0.9250

0.1502
1043.698

Prob > F
0.3368
0.0002 *
0.0014 *

For this set of data, at the 0.05 confidence level, the number of MRM and the
number of Red Fighters do not have a statistically significant effect on the total time
spent in the sweep area conducting the mission. However, all the other factors do
significantly affect the mission time. Figure 36 shows the prediction profiler tool that
JMP has. This allows us to quickly explore various scenarios of the factors, get the
associated mean response predicted by the model and a prediction confidence interval
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(also referred to as a prediction interval) on the results. For this measure, the original
response data showed a non-constant variance problem in the residuals, which required
an inverse transform to provide a more accurate model based on the data. The number
reported in Figure 36 is read as the time in seconds because JMP automatically converts
back from the inverse given by the model.
From Figure 36, we see that, in general, using more CUDA or more MRM
missiles results in short mission times, whereas using more SRM tends to lengthen the
mission times. Note that the effects of each factor on the mission time are very small
compared to the choice of tactic. Use of the straight-in tactic is associated with
significantly shorter mission times. This is primarily because the pincer tactic requires
more time to set up a feasible shot at a Red Fighter.

Prediction Profiler

Time (sec)

14000
4001.717
[3854.82,
4160.26]

10000
6000

8

7

6

5

8
4

8
NumRedFighters

Straight-In
BlueTactics

Pincer

8
NumCUDAS

6

2

4

3

4
0

2

3

1

0
NumSRM

ght-In

0
NumMRM

4
0

2

1

0

2000

Figure 36: Time as a function of each factor in the model (JMP Prediction Profiler)

Tables 7 and 8 show times and 95% prediction intervals for various mixes of
missiles with Blue using the straight-in tactic and pincer tactic, respectively. Both sets of
data are for eight Red fighters in the mission area.
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Table 7: Mission Times for Blue Straight-In Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number Average Time
MRM
SRM
CUDA
(minutes)
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

73.72
66.98
66.60
66.92
74.19

Lower

Upper

70.78
64.55
64.25
64.69
71.44

76.92
69.61
69.13
69.29
77.17

Table 8: Mission Times for Blue Pincer Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number
Average Time
MRM
SRM
CUDA
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

149.60
124.24
122.92
124.00
151.55

Lower

Upper

138.23
116.30
114.95
115.85
141.44

163.00
133.34
132.08
133.38
163.22

Note that these figures are from the constructed model used in the experimental
design analysis. These averages should not be taken as actual performance. The most
important use for these numbers is to show the differences between the mixes of weapons
systems so that meaningful insights can be drawn about how the systems compare to each
other. Figure 37 depicts the information shown in Tables 7 and 8.
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Figure 37: Time to Service Target Set/Reach final sweep route destination for
various mixes of weapons

Figure 37 illustrates that use of the pincer tactic incurs a large increase in the
average mission time over the use of straight-in tactics. Despite the larger prediction
intervals for the pincer tactic, none of the intervals overlaps, meaning that the difference
between the two tactics is statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level. The large
increase for the pincer tactic is also a practical difference, almost doubling the average
mission time of using the straight-in tactic.
Any mix of weapons that includes the CUDA missile (Mix 1, Mix 2, and SACM
pure) does effect a statistically significant decrease in mission time, but a very small
decrease in comparison with the large difference due to choice in tactics. It can be
argued whether the shorter mission times due to the CUDA have any practical difference.
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MOE2: Percent Targets Destroyed.
The ANOVA for percent of targets destroyed is shown in Table 9. All of the
factors appear to have some level of significance in determining the proportion of targets
destroyed, although the choice of tactic is borderline significant, as depicted in Figure 39
to have a very small effect on the proportion of Red targets destroyed by Blue. A second
order term in the number of CUDA is also showing significance.

Table 9: ANOVA Percent of Targets Destroyed
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
Source

DF
6

Squares
11.946159

Error

353

9.375875

C. Total

359

21.322034

Model

Mean Square
1.99103
0.02656

F Ratio
74.9618
Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
DF

NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

NumSRM(0,4)

F Ratio

1

Squares
1.4772606

1

1

2.0059906

75.5252

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

1

6.4945023

244.5168

NumRedFighters(4,8)
BlueTactics

1

1

2.6378017

99.3128

1

1

0.1026186

3.8636

NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

1

1

0.4076256

15.3470

Source

55.6186

Prob > F
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
0.0501
0.0001 *

Figure 38 shows that generally increasing the number of each missile increases
the relative percentage of Red destroyed. The straight-in tactic seems to indicate greater
percentage of targets destroyed than use of the pincer tactic. Interestingly, as the number
of Red fighters increase the proportion of targets that Blue is able to destroy decreases.
Additionally, there appears to be some curvature in the effect due to number of
CUDA. This may indicate a diminishing return in that there is less increase in percentage
of destroyed targets with increasing CUDA.
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Figure 38: Proportion of Targets Destroyed as a function of each factor (JMP
Prediction Profiler)

Tables 10 and 11 show the proportions of targets destroyed for various mixes of
weapons for the straight-in tactic and pincer tactic respectively and number of Red
fighters held constant at eight. This model has some borderline issues with non-constant
variance within the residuals that may mean other methods of analysis are needed for this
proportional data, including consideration of higher order ANOVA models and
experimental designs with more design points and more replications to control variance.
Again, these numbers are not meant as indicative of actual performance in a sweep
scenario; rather, they are more useful in comparison to each other.

Table 10: Percent of Targets Destroyed; Blue Straight-In Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Number Number Number
Mix Name
SRM
MRM
CUDA
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0
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Proportion of
Targets
Destroyed
0.52
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.51

Lower

Upper

0.48
0.67
0.69
0.71
0.46

0.56
0.76
0.78
0.80
0.55

Table 11: Percent of Targets Destroyed; Blue Pincer Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Number Number Number
Mix Name
MRM
SRM
CUDA
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

Proportion of
Targets
Destroyed
0.49
0.68
0.70
0.72
0.47

Lower

Upper

0.45
0.64
0.65
0.67
0.43

0.52
0.73
0.75
0.77
0.51

Figure 39 depicts the information in Tables 10 and 11. Undoubtedly, mixes that
include the CUDA perform significantly better over the MRM mixes, improving the
proportion of targets destroyed by around 20%, which is both statistically significant (no
overlap of the 95% prediction intervals) and realistically useful. However, there does not
appear to be any statistically significant difference between each of the CUDA mixes at
the 0.05 confidence level. Intriguingly, this also applies to the choice of tactic. Neither
the pincer nor the straight-in tactic produces a significant difference in the proportion of
the target set destroyed.
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Figure 39: Proportion of Red Targets Destroyed by Blue for various weapon mixes

MOE 3A Weapon Effectiveness.
MOE 3A is calculated by dividing the total number of weapons fired by the total
number targets destroyed. This calculation has an advantage of capturing the
effectiveness of ground weapons due to the interaction of air-to-air combat outcomes.
We further conducted analysis on the total number of air to air weapons fired by Blue
divided the total number of air targets destroyed in order to provide information specific
to the air combat portion of the scenario. We call this Air Weapon Effectiveness
(MOE3B) in the next section.
The ANOVA again required a transformation on the response for the total weapon
effectiveness number. The ANOVA, Table 12, is for a reduced model with an inverse
transform on the response. Note that two second-order terms are included here to show
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that there appears to be curvature in the weapon effectiveness response due to the CUDA
and SRM.

Table 12: ANOVA for Total Weapon Effectiveness Response
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
Source

DF

Mean Square

7

Squares
6.623674

Error

350

5.398888

0.015425

C. Total

357

12.022562

Model

0.946239

F Ratio
61.3429
Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
DF

NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

NumSRM(0,4)

Source

F Ratio

1

Squares
4.4322529

287.3348

1

1

3.5793994

232.0459

Prob > F
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

1

0.6809022

44.1416

NumRedFighters(4,8)
BlueTactics

1

1

0.2748019

17.8149

1

1

1.2082887

78.3311

NumSRM*NumSRM

1

1

0.0963315

6.2450

<.0001 *
<.0001 *
0.0129 *

NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

1

1

0.1942966

12.5959

0.0004 *

Figure 40 shows the weapon effectiveness contributions by each factor.
Generally, with increasing number of missiles, there is an increase in the number
weapons fired per target. The straight-in tactic seems to show an increase of weapons
used per target over the pincer tactic. Although the number of Red fighters is statistically
significant, it does not have a large effect on the weapon effectiveness.
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8
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6
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Figure 40: Total Weapon Effectiveness as a function of each factor (JMP Prediction
Profiler)

Table 13 and Table 14 show average weapon effectiveness numbers for the
various mixes using the straight-in tactic and the pincer tactic, respectively. Of note, the
pincer lowers the number of weapons used per target significantly, particularly when
CUDA is used. CUDA, and any mix involving CUDA, lowers number of weapons used
per target significantly in both cases. Figure 41 illustrates these differences more clearly.
What this means from a practical standpoint, because it is hard to envision decimals of a
missile, is that on average, fewer missiles are used to produce the same amount of
damage. It is certainly questionable whether the decrease is militarily useful, but we
argue later that the decrease contributes to a decrease in risk and average mission times.
Table 13: Total Weapon Effectiveness; Blue Straight-In Tactic, 8 Red Fighters
Number Number Number
Mix Name
MRM
SRM
CUDA
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0
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Total Wpn
Effectiveness
(Wpns Fired/Tgt
Dest)
2.13
1.70
1.55
1.57
2.43

Lower

Upper

1.96
1.60
1.46
1.49
2.23

2.34
1.82
1.65
1.67
2.66

Table 14: Total Weapon Effectiveness; Blue Pincer Tactic, 8 Red Fighters
Total Wpn
Effectiveness
(Wpns Fired/Tgt
Dest)
1.70
1.41
1.31
1.32
1.88

Number Number Number
MRM
SRM
CUDA

Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

Lower

Upper

1.59
1.34
1.24
1.26
1.77

1.82
1.49
1.38
1.39
2.00

Number of Weapons Fired per Target Destroyed (All)

3.00
2.43
2.50

2.00

2.13
1.88
1.70

1.70
1.55
1.41

1.50

1.57
1.32

1.31

Straight-In Tactic, 8 Red fighters
Pincer Tactic

1.00

0.50

0.00
Baseline

Mix 1

Mix 2

SACM Pure MRM Pure

Weapons System Mix

Figure 41: Total Weapon Effectiveness for various mixes of weapons

MOE 3: Air-to-Air Weapon Effectiveness.
The ANOVA model for this MOE had problems with normality in the residuals
and non-constant variance of the residuals. To fix this, a transform is applied to the
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response: ln (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 1). The number of Red fighters is not a significant factor and
is removed from the model.

Table 15: ANOVA Air Weapon Effectiveness
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
Source

DF
5

Model
Error

348

28.39213

C. Total

353

124.84561

F Ratio

Mean Square

Squares
96.45348

19.2907
0.0816

236.4445
Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

DF

NumSRM(0,4)

1

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

BlueTactics
NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

Source

F Ratio

Prob > F

Squares
80.305995

984.3040

1

65.886593

807.5666

1

26.579873

325.7873

1

1

2.663681

32.6485

<.0001 *
<.0001 *

1

1

2.614612

32.0471

<.0001 *

1

<.0001 *
<.0001 *

Tables 16 and 17 show average air-to-air weapon effectiveness for various mixes
using the straight-in tactic and pincer tactic, respectively. The pincer tactic decreases the
weapons per target, as does any mix including the CUDA.

Table 16: Air-to-Air Weapon Effectiveness; Straight-In Tactic
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number
MRM
SRM
CUDA
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0
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A2A Wpn
Effectiveness
(Wpns Fired/Tgt
Dest)
3.88
2.06
1.83
1.75
4.27

Lower

Upper

3.60
1.84
1.63
1.55
3.88

4.17
2.29
2.05
1.96
4.68

Table 17: Air-to-Air Weapon Effectiveness; Pincer Tactic
Mix Name

Number Number Number
MRM
SRM
CUDA

Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

A2A Wpn
Effectiveness
(Wpns Fired/Tgt
Dest)
3.08
1.56
1.37
1.30
3.41

Lower

Upper

2.88
1.37
1.20
1.11
3.10

3.29
1.75
1.55
1.50
3.73

Figure 42 shows that, although the pincer tactic does decrease the weapons used
per air target, including the CUDA in the weapon mix decreases the weapons per target
significantly for both tactics. Again, the combination of pincer and CUDA weapon mix
uses the least number of weapons per target.
4.27

Number of Weapons Fired per Target Destroyed (A2A)

5.00
4.50

3.88

4.00
3.50

3.41
3.08

3.00
2.06

2.50

1.75

1.83

2.00

1.56

Straight-In Tactic
Pincer Tactic

1.37

1.30

1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Baseline

Mix 1

Mix 2

SACM Pure

MRM Pure

Weapons System Mix

Figure 42: Air to Air Weapon Effectiveness for various mixes of weapons
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MOE 4: Average Engagement Distance
The average engagement distance gives an idea of where engagements are
generally taking place and how safe the Blue fighters are relative to the targets. Red
weapons become more effective closer in; therefore, standoff generally is viewed as
decreasing risk associated with air combat.
The ANOVA model for this MOE requires a square root transformation on the
response to fix normality and non-constant variance issues on the residuals. The
ANOVA is shown in Table 18. The number of MRM is not significant in the model, but
is kept, as it is one of the main factors we are investigating. Additionally, the number of
Red fighters is significant statistically, but does not provide a large effect on the average
engagement distance.
Table 18: ANOVA Average Engagement Distance
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
Source

DF
7

Model

Squares
315017.34

Error

350

94656.73

C. Total

357

409674.07

F Ratio

Mean Square
45002.5

166.3999

270.4

Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
DF

NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

NumSRM(0,4)

1

1

79842.795

295.2244

Source

1

Squares
386.939

F Ratio
1.4307

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

1

15461.669

57.1706

NumRedFighters(4,8)
BlueTactics

1

1

2427.759

8.9768

1

1

51437.431

190.1936

NumSRM*NumSRM

1

1

4509.499

16.6742

NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

1

1

5947.050

21.9896

Prob > F
0.2325
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
0.0029 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *

Table 19 and Table 20 show various engagement distances, as calculated by the
ANOVA model, with 95% prediction intervals for the straight-in tactic and the pincer
tactic, respectively, with number of Red fighters held constant at eight. CUDA seems to
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significantly increase average engagement distances when it is included in the mix. The
SACM pure (CUDA) mix and Mix 1, involving the CUDA and MRM, are significantly
greater than all the mixes. A visualization of these numbers is depicted in Figure 43.

Table 19: Average Engagement Distances; Straight-In Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number
MRM
SRM
CUDA
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

Average
Engagement
Distance (km)
25.56
39.57
33.94
40.30
30.46

Lower

Upper

23.83
37.59
32.00
38.38
28.84

27.34
41.59
35.94
42.26
32.14

Table 20: Average Engagement Distances; Pincer Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number
MRM
SRM
CUDA
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0
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Average
Engagement
Distance (km)
18.23
30.30
25.41
30.94
22.41

Lower

Upper

16.80
28.61
23.70
29.12
21.12

19.72
32.05
27.18
32.82
23.74

45.00

40.30

39.57

Average Engagement Distance (km)

40.00

33.94

35.00
30.00

30.46
30.94

30.30
25.56

25.41
22.41

25.00
18.23

Straight-In Tactic, 8 Red Fighters

20.00

Pincer Tactic, 8 Red Fighters
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
Baseline

Mix 1

Mix 2

SACM Pure MRM Pure

Weapons System Mix

Figure 43: Average Engagement Distance in kilometers for various mixes of
weapons

MOE5: Number of Hits on Blue
The ANOVA for the number of hits on Blue is shown in Table 21. The response
required a cube root transformation of the form (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 + 1)0.3 due to normality and

non-constant variance problems in the residuals. All the factors are significant, including
second-order terms for number of Red Fighters and the number of CUDA. As a caution,
2
2
the final model for this MOE has a low 𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
number and significant lack of fit (𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗
=

0.4759). This means that there are most likely additional factors influencing the number
of times that Blue aircraft are hit that are not considered in this study. For now, the

model is sufficient to provide insight into how the factors interact with respect to the Blue
agent’s vulnerability within the mission area.
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Table 21: ANOVA Number of Hits on Blue
Analysis of Variance
Sum of
DF

Source

7

Squares
36.375917

Error

352

38.447792

C. Total

359

74.823709

Model

Mean Square
5.19656
0.10923

F Ratio
47.5759
Prob > F
<.0001 *

Effect Tests
Sum of
DF

NumMRM(0,4)

Nparm
1

NumSRM(0,4)

F Ratio

1

Squares
0.764739

1

1

4.547048

41.6295

NumCUDAS(0,8)

1

1

9.587299

87.7743

NumRedFighters(4,8)
BlueTactics

1

1

15.551415

142.3774

1

1

2.943887

26.9521

NumCUDAS*NumCUDAS

1

1

0.930008

8.5145

NumRedFighters*NumRedFighters

1

1

1.004532

9.1968

Source

7.0014

Prob > F
0.0085 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
<.0001 *
0.0037 *
0.0026 *

Tables 22 and 23 show the number of hits on Blue fighters for the straight-in
tactic and the pincer tactic, respectively. Mixes that include CUDA show a significant
decrease in how many hits Blue suffers over the other two cases. To reiterate, there are
additional factors affecting the number of hits that Blue receives, such as passive threat
detectors, pilot risk avoidance measures, etc. This model only considers specific factors
associated with studying the effects of the mixes of offensive weapons arrayed on the
Blue agents.
Generally, it can be seen in Figure 44 that the number of hits that Blue takes
increase with use of the pincer over a straight-in tactic. The cases pictured in Figure 44
are those with the number of Red fighters held to eight. The model, intuitively, outputs
less hits on Blue for less Red fighters, due to fewer chances for Red to fire at Blue (not
depicted here for brevity).
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Table 22: Number of Hits on Blue; Straight-In Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number Number of Hits on
MRM
SRM
CUDA
Blue
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

8.87
5.60
4.31
4.73
10.83

Lower

Upper

7.58
4.42
3.28
3.67
9.12

10.29
6.94
5.50
5.94
12.74

Table 23: Number of Hits on Blue; Pincer Tactic with 8 Red Fighters
Mix Name
Baseline
Mix 1
Mix 2
SACM Pure
MRM Pure

Number Number Number Number of Hits on
MRM
SRM
CUDA
Blue
2
2
0
0
4

2
0
2
0
0

0
4
4
8
0

12.32
8.23
6.59
7.13
14.73
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Lower

Upper

10.87
6.73
5.25
5.67
12.77

13.90
9.93
8.12
8.80
16.88

14.73

18.00
16.00

12.32

Number of Red Hits on Blue

14.00
12.00

10.83
8.23

7.13

8.87
6.59

10.00
8.00

Straight-In Tactic, 8 Red Fighters

5.60
4.31

6.00

4.73

Pincer Tactic, 8 Red Fighters

4.00
2.00
0.00
Baseline

Mix 1

Mix 2

SACM Pure MRM Pure

Weapons System Mix

Figure 44: Number of Red weapon hits on Blue agents for various Blue weapon
mixes

Investigative Questions Answered
1. What is the benefit of being able to carry more missiles? How does
size/weight of missile affect mission outcomes?
Weapon system load out mixes for fourth generation fighter aircraft that include
the new missile technology (CUDA/SACM) significantly decreases times to service
target set over the mixes without (MOE 1), but with a very small effect compared to the
choice of tactic. Most of the decrease in average mission time is likely related to the
higher effectiveness of the CUDA weapons mixes over the other mixes. Blue aircraft
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using a CUDA mix need to use less weapons per target, meaning that there is less time
spent re-engaging after an initial engagement was unsuccessful.
Mixes including the new missile technology show a significant increase in
proportion of a target set destroyed for the sweep mission (MOE 2). This increase was
large for CUDA mixes, meaning that when the new missile is used the overall mission
effectiveness increases considerably. In mission scenarios, such as the sweep mission,
that have follow on missions using the cleared mission corridor to execute a strategic
target, this increase can have an impact.
Mixes including the CUDA show a decrease in the number of weapons used per
target destroyed for both the total target set and for the air target set over mixes that do
not include the CUDA (MOE 3A and 3B). In terms of mission effectiveness, a greater
portion of the target set for the mission is destroyed more efficiently using mixes of
weapons systems that include the CUDA. This means there are fewer weapons used to
yield a greater number of destroyed targets and is due to the improved single shot kill
probabilities, maneuverability, and range of the new missile. As mentioned, this
contributes to faster mission completion. Higher effectiveness also helps decrease risk to
the pilot and aircraft. The more maneuvering a fighter must do against a target, for
instance if the first shot fails, the more likely the fighter will be shot at by the enemy
aircraft. Admittedly, the decrease in weapons per target is small, but it is statistically
significant. From a risk standpoint, any decrease, even a small decrease, in risk is
desirable and can have practical significance depending on the situation.
Mixes including the CUDA show statistical evidence of decreasing the number of
hits on Blue aircraft over mixes not including the CUDA (MOE 5). The significant
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increase in standoff distance gained by use of the CUDA (MOE 4) contributes to this
decrease in hits on Blue. Tactics and weapons that increase engagement distances help
reduce risk to the aircraft able to employ these tactics and weapons.
Finally, the benefit of carrying a greater number of a smaller sized missile has
diminishing returns in terms of weapon effectiveness and efficiency and is highly
dependent on the number of enemy aircraft/ground targets within the mission area. Our
sweep scenario is a simple one, but the number of enemy fighters in this scenario does
not stress a fourth generation fighter with the ability to carry twice as many or three times
as many of the new missile technology. In fact, we artificially lower the number of
missiles available on the Blue aircraft in order to use the simulation to construct a
suitable statistical model of effects of the missile system mixes. In other words, the Blue
fighters should carry what is expected to be needed for a specific mission. If more
missiles can be carried because of their lighter weight and smaller size, then it is also true
that more cargo (fuel, electronic warfare equipment, etc.) can be carried because of the
savings in weight if fewer missiles are carried. The main benefit in this type of new
missile in terms of carrying capacity is in the flexibility it adds to the mission planning
and load-out of a flight of fourth generation fighters.
2. What is the proper mix of weapons? How does mission mode (air-to-air,
air-to-ground) affect mission outcomes? Is there a benefit to carrying a
mix of weapons?
Clearly, MOE 1, 3A, 3B show significant improvement, statistically, for
CUDA/SACM pure weapons mixes. Generally, carrying a mix of weapons shows no
improvement over the pure weapon options. However, there are circumstances in which
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short range air to air may be necessary, such as if, through maneuvering to gain
advantage, the Blue finds itself at extremely close range, where use of CUDA or MRM
may not be possible. Gun weapons systems were not modeled but could be an answer for
extreme short range as well.
3. What new tactics are possible given new weapon characteristics? Do
tactics change over the range of each of the characteristics of the new
missile type?
Generally, pincer tactics results in longer mission times, smaller proportion of
targets destroyed, shorter average engagement distances, and increased number of hits on
Blue agents for all mixes (MOE 1, 2, 4, 5). Intuitively, mission times are lower for
tactics like straight-in that move directly to contact as opposed to tactics like the pincer
that take time for the aircraft to maneuver wide of the enemy aircraft into flanking
positions. Use of the CUDA in conjunction with either of the tactics did not seem to
produce particularly inflated effects on the average mission time. CUDA weapons mixes
did decrease mission times somewhat more combined with the pincer tactic, but probably
not enough to be useful when compared with the decrease in mission time observed with
the straight-in tactic.
The pincer tactic did significantly decrease the number of weapons used per target
destroyed for both all targets and air targets (MOE 3A, 3B). Combinations of CUDA
weapons mixes and use of the pincer tactic actually provided the least number of
weapons used per target.
The average engagement distance is significantly increased for CUDA/SACM
mixes over other mixes (MOE 4), and as discussed this provides a benefit in terms of risk
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reduction. Tactics most suited to take advantage of this increased standoff capability are
tactics such as the lead/trail tactic discussed in Chapter 3.
Of note, the extreme short fall in the pincer tactic is partially the result of two
aspects of our simulation model. One is that no AWACS is included in the scenario so
that the Blue agents receive no early warning and no constant update of threat locations
and actions. The second is that the Blue aircraft are not outfitted with passive warning
sensors to alert of incoming missiles. Rather, the Blue agents in the simulation rely
solely on their fire control radars to detect all objects in the air and a threat processor that
“tells” the agent if any of the tracks sensed by the radar is an incoming missile. Because
of these two characteristics of the simulation scenario, the Blue agents lose situational
awareness during a pincer as they turn to move to the flank of detected Red fighters.
Regardless of the characteristics of our scenario, the pincer tactic does take time
to develop and is slower than moving straight to contact. As discussed above, the CUDA
missile has the ability to provide more flexible engagement options in terms of range and
target aspect angles. Tactics that attempt to maintain a BVR (Beyond Visual
Recognition) engagement, such as the lead/trail tactic, can benefit from use of a CUDA
weapon mix. A combination of the lead/trail tactic and some type of flanking maneuver
may even prove advantageous. This combination could provide standoff while allowing
the Blue side to use a portion of its force on the longer flanking move.
Summary
The new missile technology investigated in this simulation study shows some
clear advantages. Although the model of the CUDA used in this simulation is an
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unclassified approximation of the true missile characteristics, the scenario showed that
mixes using the CUDA improved in nearly every category over mixes including just
medium range missiles or MRMs and short-range missiles. CUDA increased average
engagement distances and decreased number of weapons used per target, which both
contribute to a reduction in risk. CUDA mixes also exhibit a practical increase in
proportion of the target set killed, useful if the area needs to be swept as clear as possible
of designated enemy air and ground targets. CUDA mixes did statistically lower average
mission times, however the realistic effect is very small compared with the effect due to
choice of tactic and may not be useful for consideration as a benefit. Tactics best suited
to the new missile are ones that maintain BVR to take advantage of the increased
engagement ranges and possibly combined tactics that allow the flexible maneuvering
characteristics of the new missiles to engage enemy aircraft at angles that the enemy
aircraft will be unable to counter.
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V.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Review of the Weapon Systems Methodology Developed

Figure 45: Simulation Study Methodology for the Weapon System Analysis

At its core, the methodology used in this analysis is a study using simulation as a
designed experiment to investigate the benefits of a new weapon system. Figure 45
demonstrates the high-level study steps taken as a framework for execution of this
analysis. The literature search involves researching published works and interviewing
subject matter experts in order to determine the scope of the problem and formulate a
problem statement. This leads into forming Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that
allow us to distinguish the benefits of the new weapons system. For this study, the
MOE’s chosen are the average mission time, the proportion of the target set destroyed, a
weapons effectiveness indicator, the average engagement distance, and the number of hits
that the Red force is able to make against our Blue force.
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Within the framework of the MOEs, a measurement space is developed that
allows us to choose particular scenarios in which to test our new weapon system and set
certain conditions that provide effects that the weapon system may interact with in order
to supply us with information about the weapon system performance. Within this step,
we also designate the factors we wish to investigate. These are the controlled, or
decision, variables. In our study, the factors are the number of MRM, the number of
SRM, the number of CUDA (the new weapon system of interest), the number of Red
fighter aircraft, and the tactic used. The scenario we chose was the sweep scenario for
several reasons. It fit the scope of demonstrating a simulation analysis methodology
using a designed experiment. The scenario has all the aspects of air combat and many of
the situations in which the new weapon system may be used. It is also scalable, from
simple to complex, less opposing forces to more, etc. The sweep scenario is well defined
in several sources, as discussed in Chapter 2. Finally, the Air Force Research Laboratory
RQ division had recently developed the scenario within the AFSIM simulation
framework. There are many scenarios, such as defensive counter air, airborne weapons
layer, etc., that should also be used as a part of a comprehensive investigation of this
missile system.
The next step in the study was to develop the scenario within a simulation
environment. We chose AFSIM, for many reasons detailed in previous chapters, but
particularly because of the simulation framework’s object oriented nature. AFSIM has
been in use for over ten years and has an extensive library of models that can be used in a
simulation scenario, from aerodynamics and weapons effects models to pilot behavioral
models. More importantly, scenarios, platforms, equipment, weapons and sensors
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models previously developed for other scenarios and studies can quickly be adapted to
the current study. For our purposes, the sweep scenario that AFRL/RQ developed needs
little adaptation. We added more Red fighters, changed the behavioral engines of the
various agents involved in the scenario, and added a few weapons models, specifically
the CUDA, JDAM, and SRM models. However, the additional weapons systems needed
very little work. We simply took previously defined missiles and adapted them to the
specific characteristics of the new weapon system. This is the power of object oriented
simulation models such as AFSIM.
Once the simulation model is constructed, it must be verified and validated. For
the purposes of this study most of the verification is conducted through repeated
visualization and adjustment of the scripts governing the simulation. Minimal validation
was performed using subject matter experts to provide unofficial quality checks.
Validation of many of the base models contained in the libraries in AFSIM is a much
larger process and is currently being conducted by AF/A9.
After a valid model is ready, an experiment is designed using the factors defined
in an earlier step. Because of the complex nature of the factors involved in this study, the
JMP statistical package was used to provide a custom design as discussed in Chapter 4.
We run the simulation model at each treatment combination, or design point, in the
experimental design matrix as shown in Table 24. In order to provide a better statistical
model, one that has a solid estimate of error, 20 replicates for each of the 18 design points
are run. Each response recorded corresponds to one of the MOEs.
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Table 24: JMP Custom D-Optimal Design Matrix

As soon as the simulation runs are made, the data is collected using some sort of
post processor to translate the simulation output into usable numbers. For our study, we
developed a post processor for AFSIM that uses the comma-delimited files output by
AFSIM’s simulation control engine. The post processor has a Microsoft Excel front end
that uses Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) to call R scripts that parse the comma
delimited text files, calculates the specific data required for the MOEs, and then places
that data in a format more accessible to further statistical analysis. R has a very useful
data structure, called a data frame, and many powerful functions that can slice and
summarize the data in a data frame. R also has some very useful statistical packages,
including design of experiments analysis, though none are used in this study.
The response data calculated from the post processor is then used to build
statistical models using analysis of variance techniques (ANOVA) that the designed
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experiment is specifically meant for. The designed experiment combined with the
ANOVA provides the most amount of information for the least amount of design points
and replications possible. For the statistical analysis of the experimental data, we
employed JMP to build statistical models for each of the responses or MOEs. We have
reported the results in Chapter 4 and briefly summarize them again here in section 5.2.
The final step is to report our insights. This paper is the culmination of the study
and is the report that shows not only our analysis results, but also details the methodology
used in order to further DOE and agent-based modeling approaches to analysis of new
weapon systems.

Summary of Findings and Insights
The main benefit of following a designed experiment approach to analysis of an
agent-based model of a complex system is that the resulting statistical models can be used
to fully explore the factor space for each desired MOE. This exploration yields
interesting insights that answer the main questions, but also provide potential avenues for
further experimentation. For example, in our study, we discovered that the factors of
number of Red fighters and number of missiles only interact with each other when the
levels are scaled such that there are not an overwhelming number of missiles (Blue
offensive capability) compared to the number of Red targets. In reality, a flight of
fighters would always be sent out with capability to overmatch the enemy. However, this
real world missile configuration does not give us very much information about how
changes in the levels of numbers of missiles carried effects the outcomes of the mission.
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For our study, further experimentation is needed to discover the effects due to a large
increase in the number of CUDA by increasing the complexity of the mission scenario.
Another insight about the methodology used for studying this new weapon system
is that the factor space involved in the air combat is complex. Experimental designs to
explore this space using agent based modeling techniques must be carefully analyzed and
compared before implementation.
Finally, the behavior engines used to drive agent behavior are very useful for
building a complex environment full of agent interaction in order to closely approximate
complex air combat systems. This allows us to capture information about comparative
performance of the different weapons mixes that may not be present in a simpler
simulation devoid of more complex agent decision-making behavior.
As for the analysis conducted on the new weapon system, our statistical models
show that we can truly show the significance of different factors effects within air
combat. For example, we are able to show a both a statistically significant difference and
a militarily useful difference in the proportion of target set destroyed. As a contrast, our
results also show that use of the CUDA is statistically significant in driving down average
mission times, but the amount by which those times are decreased, on average, may not
have a practical significance. Still, these types of conclusions allow us to glimpse more
information about how the system works and find benefits that we may have only
hypothesized.
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Recommendations for Future Research
Use of Advanced Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning Methods.
One avenue for future research we suggest is implementation of the Unified
Behavior Framework (UBF), discussed in Chapter 2, within the complex scenario. The
research would have the goal of discovering more useful tactics to employ with the new
weapon system. By allowing agents in the simulation to make more complex decisions
that have an element of learning, the emergent behaviors can be captured and analyzed to
show the range of tactical options that may be paired with the new weapon system.
Additionally, different algorithms for the deliberative functions of the behavior
framework should be tried. For instance, heuristic algorithms, such as tabu search or
simulated annealing that provide near optimal rather than optimal solutions to the
weapon-target assignment problem, may provide a closer approximation to how pilots
make this critical decision in reality. Learning technologies may also be implemented in
the deliberative layer to allow the agents to update their tactics according to the state of
the environment and to learn what tactics work best. This method of agent behavior at
the deliberative layer may provide more emergent behaviors to study for better tactics to
use with the new weapon system.
Analysis of the New Missile System in Alternative Scenarios
Our study focused on only one of the mission roles for which this new weapon
system can possibly be used. Future research should include analysis of the weapon
system in several different scenarios. We suggest, at a minimum, defensive counter-air
and airborne weapons layer scenarios.
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Additionally, more advanced fighters and different types of fighters and sensors
should be included in future scenarios. For instance, an AWACS should be included in at
least one scenario to provide more information on how situational awareness may affect
the choice of tactic used.
Weapon System Cost Benefits
In today’s budget constrained environment, costs are a very important component
of the analysis of any weapon system. To provide a comprehensive analysis, future
research must include cost analysis in terms of fuel costs, procurement, and life-cycle
costs. For instance, smaller, lighter missiles may produce less fuel consumption over
mission distances.
Effects of Capability to Carry Large Number of New Missiles
As discussed in Chapter 4, this study limited the ratio of missiles carried to
number of Red air targets in order to bring the two numbers more into parity. To address
this, we slightly increased the number of Red air targets and halved the number of
missiles the Blue fighters carried. Further research should investigate more complex
scenarios with very large numbers of Red fighters to show if the trends of increasing the
new weapons system provides similar benefits over much different measurement space.
For instance, there was a diminishing return on the proportion of the target set destroyed
for an increase in the number of new missiles. The investigation may reveal that this
holds over a much different target set or that there is a different relationship as the
number of targets increases drastically.
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Conclusion
We have presented a methodology for conducting analysis of a new weapon
system under consideration for different mission roles. The main elements of this
methodology include a designed simulation experiment, agent-based modeling and
artificial intelligence techniques, and basic data analysis techniques. The simulation
provides insights in the stochastic nature of the complex systems under investigation.
Building a simulation using semi-autonomous agents induces further complexity that
more closely mirrors the complex system that combat represents. A designed experiment
provides a wealth of information on the factors and response of the complex system to
help us discover meaningful insights into the system and the benefits of using the new
weapon system. Finally, statistical analysis shows the how the various components
interact with each other and provides a method to compare different possibilities
throughout the total space of factor combinations.
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Appendix A: Example AFSIM comma delimited output file

Figure 46: Weapon Event Data Output from AFSIM simulation run, first 11 columns out
of 45 columns in original file
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Appendix B: Thesis Story Board Poster
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